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The problem of free will is a long-standing and controversial problem in philosophy. Though there are 
many angles to the question of whether human beings have free will or not, one of the key 
contemporary challenges is ’the problem of luck’. The problem challenges the idea that we can have 
free will in an ontologically indeterministic world, by raising the objection that ontological 
indeterminism in the mechanisms of human decision-making introduces an element of freedom-
undermining randomness. In light of contemporary probabilistic models from science, the problem of 
luck is becoming increasingly more relevant. This problem serves as the core motivation of this thesis. 
 The primary research question asks how probabilistic uncertainties in the mechanisms 
underlying intentional action should affect our understanding of free will. The thesis consists of three 
parts, which in combination aim to address this overarching question. 
 The first part asks first what the ordinary concept of free will is, and secondly whether the 
common-sense notion of free will changes with differing beliefs about whether substance dualism or 
physicalism is true. I.e. whether different beliefs about physicalism drive different free will conceptions. 
These two questions are explored through two empirical experiments. The first experiment investigates 
whether the folk-concept of free will is compatibilist, incompatibilist, or hard incompatibilist. Our 
findings support the hypothesis that the common-sense notion of free will is incompatibilist, but not 
hard incompatibilist. That is, laypeople conceive free will as incompatible with determinism, but 
compatible with the presence of probabilistic chance. The second experiment examines if more 
physicalist beliefs drive more incompatibilist and hard incompatibilist conceptions of free will. While we 
find support for apparent differences in free will conceptions based on beliefs in physicalism, this 
difference is shown to be driven by different understandings of determinism: Physicalist beliefs drive 
epiphenomenal interpretations of determinism. Such interpretations are at odds with the philosophical 
concept of determinism. When this understanding error is corrected, we find no support for genuine 
differences in free will conceptions between dualists and physicalists. Whether people believe in 
physicalism or substance-dualism, the common-sense notion of free will remains incompatibilist but not 
hard incompatibilist. 
 The second part asks if we have good reasons to accept ontological indeterminism. Three 
different epistemological approaches to the question are considered: Direct scientific realism, virtue 
epistemology, and epistemic pragmatism. It is argued that regardless of which epistemological approach 
we choose, we have sufficient reason to accept ontological indeterminism. Particular emphasis is put on 
iii 
the approach from epistemic virtues. It is argued that to satisfy the virtue of being genuinely self-critical, 
we must accept ontological indeterminism in light of best-explanation probabilistic models. 
 The third part asks what kind of control indeterministic agents can have that would alleviate the 
problem of luck. A reconceptualization of free will is proposed, which builds upon the common-sense 
notion of free will. The problem of luck, it is argued, confronts us with a conceptual choice: Either we 
must abandon the idea of free will for ontologically indeterministic agents or we must accept an 
element of randomness as part of freedom. Choosing the second horn, it is proposed that 
indeterministic agents with the capacity for recursive decision-making, i.e. decisions that target and alter 
the agent’s own motivational structure, have an important kind of control over their own internal 
randomness. Although luck remains to some degree, it is argued that having the capacity for recursive 
decisions nevertheless reduces the problem. As a consequence of this reconceptualization, it is argued 
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Determinism: At any instant, exactly 
one possible future is compatible 
with the laws of nature and the state 
of the world at that instant. 
 
Indeterminism: The negation of 
determinism. I.e. at any instant, more 
than one possible future is 
compatible with the laws of nature 
and the state of the world at that 
instant. 
 
Compatibilism: The idea that free will 
is compatible with determinism. 
 
Incompatibilism: The idea that free 
will is incompatible with 
determinism. 
 
Hard Incompatibilism: The idea that 
free will is incompatible with both 
determinism and indeterminism. 
1. General Introduction 
 
”...as absence of necessity is characteristic of what is free, the latter would have to be dependent on 
absolutely no cause at all, and consequently would have to be defined as absolutely contingent. This is 
an extremely problematic concept, one whose conceivability I cannot vouch for, and one which 
nevertheless coincides in a curious way with the concept of freedom.” – Arthur Schopenhauer 
(Schopenhauer 1839) 
 
Are we in control of how we act? What if everything we do is the 
outcome of probabilistic, chancy, processes? It certainly feels like we are 
in control of how we act at least some of the time, and that what we do 
and what we choose to do is ‘up to us’. This idea is a core part of our self-
conception as persons, and many of our social practices such as law and 
the whole endeavour of ethics and moral responsibility are often 
thought to depend upon it. And yet, it is by no means a trivial matter 
whether our choices and actions are really ‘up to us’, and what exactly 
this entails. The question of whether we are ever really in control of how 
we act, and what ‘being in control’ involves, constitutes the core of the 
free will problem. 
Traditionally, the focus of the free will problem has mostly been 
on whether free will is compatible with determinism or not. However, in 
the last century or so, scientific discoveries have increasingly thrown 
doubt on the traditional view of the natural world as a deterministic 
machinery. First, with the discovery of quantum physics at the 
fundamental level of subatomic particles at the turn of the last century, 
and more recently with the discoveries of contemporary neuroscience 
which commonly model the biological processes of the brain as 
probabilistic, indeterministic, mechanisms (see section 1.2 and chapter 4, 
section 4.1). As stochastic models find increasing success in science, and especially in the sciences 
related to the mechanisms of decision-making and volitional actions, the problem of free will and 
determinism grow less relevant in our contemporary landscape. Instead, another angle of the free will 
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problem gains increasing relevance: The question of whether free will is compatible with indeterminism. 
If everything we choose and do is the consequence of probabilistic happenings, is it possible for us to 
have free will? Sceptics argue that to introduce undetermined events into the decision-making process 
introduces a freedom-undermining element of chance and randomness. This objection, known as the 
problem of luck, maintains that undetermined actions are not under the agent’s control and therefore if 
indeterminism is true, the agent’s actions are not under their control and so there is no free will. The 
work of this thesis is motivated by this consideration. Specifically, I here investigate what the common-
sense notion of free will is, I examine if we have good reasons to accept the natural world as 
ontologically indeterministic – including operations at the level of the brain, and I provide an account of 
how indeterministic agents can have control of their own internal chanciness. My aim is to contribute to 
discussions of free will at the intersection between philosophy, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, 
by providing an account of free will that is sensitive to the contemporary scientific landscape and the 
ordinary understanding of free will, and which does not neglect the problem of luck. 
Though the problem of free will is intrinsically tied to questions of responsibility, accountability, 
and morality, one of the main limitations of this thesis is that it will not directly explore the ethical 
implications of the account presented here. Instead, the focus is to establish what counts as free will 
ordinarily understood and investigate what kind of control indeterministic agents can have in light of the 
problem of luck. Whether it leaves room for moral responsibility – and what kind of responsibility it 
leaves room for – as well as the further social and practical implications of the account are left as an 
open question for future endeavours (see conclusion). While some thinkers argue that an absence of 
free will means losing responsibility and attempt to find justifications for free will (Smilansky 2000, List 
2019), others argue that moral responsibility can be detached from questions about free will (Frankfurt 
1971), while still others argue that giving up on certain ideas of free will and moral responsibility can 
improve our views on accountability and lead to more constructive and humane social practices 
(Pereboom 2001, 2013, Caruso 2016, 2019a, 2019b). Here, the indirect contribution is to stress that 
there is room for free will as it is ordinarily understood within a contemporary neuroscientific view of 
the world.  
The overarching research question asks how probabilistic uncertainties in the mechanisms 
underlying intentional action should affect our understanding of free will. Each of the four papers that 
make up the chapters of this thesis includes introductions of their own. The remainder of this general 
introduction will therefore be limited to providing the general metaphysical and methodological 
background for what’s to come. 





1.1 Metaphysical framework 
One metaphysical aspect that almost all accounts of free will agree upon is that free will 
requires mental causation. I.e. if the mind and mental states have no causal effects then free will is 
impossible1. In other words, if epiphenomenalism2 is true then free will is false. Usually, it is the 
particulars about what more is or isn’t required for free will, which sparks disagreements among 
philosophers. These disagreements concern mostly differences related to three different aspects of 
metaphysics that are commonly discussed in conjunction with each other. 1) The question of substance: 
Whether reality consists of two substances, the mental and material (substance-dualism), or if reality is 
fundamentally one substance (substance-monism). 2) The question of causal chains: Whether the 
processes of human decision-making and subsequent actions follow with necessity from the history of 
the universe (determinism)3, or if these processes include an element of innate and spontaneous chance 
(Indeterminism)4. 3) The question of mechanistic agency: Whether agentive action is reducible to the 
occurrence and interaction of certain kinds of events – usually agent-involving mental states and events 
- (event-causal accounts) or if agentive action entails an irreducible agentive component causing the 
action (agent-causal accounts). 
Every position on each of these metaphysical questions comes with their own problems and 
challenges, though they are often bundled together and discussed in an intermingled fashion. On the 
question of substance, substance dualism is most famously confronted with the problem of interaction 
(Elisabeth of Bohemia, see Shapiro 1999, Ryle 1949) but has more recently also been met with empirical 
challenges (Churchland 1984). Substance monism is confronted with the threat of epiphenomenalism 
from causal overdetermination and the challenge of non-reductive supervenience (Churchland 1986, 
Kim 1992, 2005, Tse 2011, List 2019). On the question of causal chains, determinism is confronted with 
the consequence argument (Ginet 1966, 1990, Van Inwagen 1975, 1983, Fischer 1994) and 
indeterminism is confronted with the problem of luck (Strawson 1986, Kane 1999, Mele 1999, 2006, 
Pereboom 2001, Almeida & Bernstein 2003, Sommers 2009, Caruso 2012, 2019b). On the question of 
mechanistic agency, mechanistic accounts are confronted with the problem of causal deviance 
                                                             
1 But for an example of free will that does not require consciousness see Brembs 2011. 
2 Epiphenomenalism is the idea that mental states play no causal role in the world (Robinson 2019). 
3I.e. that only one possible future is compatible with the laws of nature and the state of the world at any given 
instant. 
4 I.e. that more than one future is compatible with the laws of nature and the state of the universe at any given 
instant. 
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(Chisholm 1966, Davidson 1973, Mele 1992a, Schlosser 2007) and the problem of the disappearing 
agent5 (Melden 1961, Nagel 1986, Velleman 1992, Lowe 2008, Steward 2013), whereas irreducibly 
agentive accounts are confronted with the homunculus problem (Kenny 1971), the problem of 
substance-causality, the problem of non-explanation (Broad 1952, Taylor 1966, Davidson 1971, Van 
Inwagen 1983, Nagel 1986, Clarke 2003, Schlosser 2010, Pereboom 2014b) and empirical challenges 
(Chisholm 1964, Bok 1998, Ginet 1990, 1997, Clarke 1996, Pereboom 2001, 2014a). 
Though an exhaustive account of free will should elaborate on each of these aspects and tackle 
the challenges relevant for its respective positions, tackling all the challenges for a complete account of 
free will is too wide a scope even for a doctoral thesis. Certain limiting choices must be made about the 
surrounding metaphysical framework that serves as the background for the focus of the thesis. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I will therefore assume a substance-monist event-causal framework. The focus 
will be, as noted earlier, the problem of luck and as such the position of indeterminism regarding the 
question of causal chains. 
‘Substance monism’ is the view that everything consists of fundamentally one substance. 
Although there are different variants of substance monism, such as neutral monism (Spinoza 1677), 
idealism (Berkeley 1710), and physicalism (Neurath 1931, Carnap 1959), most contemporary 
philosophers are physicalists (Bourget & Chalmers 2013), which is the view that everything is 
fundamentally physical. I.e. that everything fundamentally consists of- or supervenes upon physical 
‘stuff’. Although there is a controversial and interesting question about whether this position leaves 
room for the mental and what role mental states and events could play in such a framework, the view I 
assume for the purpose of this thesis is a non-reductive physicalist view. The main idea is that 
everything is fundamentally physical but that consciousness and mental states exist as ontologically real 
and distinct properties of the physical (substance monism with property dualism). ‘Event-causal’ means 
simply that I accept explanations of agency in terms of agent-involving states and events as full and 
exhaustive, without reference to any irreducible agent-substance doing the causing. 
 
                                                             
5 It is common for the disappearing agent objection to be lumped together with the problem of luck, or even be 
presented as a version of the luck problem (see O’connor 2007, Pereboom 2014a, 2017). Nevertheless, I prefer to 
keep the two problems distinct as the disappearing agent objection can be more generally raised against any 
event-causal account (Mele 2003, 2015), whereas the problem of luck relates only to indeterministic accounts. 




1.2 Neuroscience, variability, and probabilities 
Neuroscience is ripe with probabilities (Manwani & Koch 1999, Faisal et al. 2008, Ermentrout et al. 
2008). At every level of neuroscientific explanations probabilities are employed. Consider the biological 
mechanisms involved in generating action potentials. Here is a simplified description of how it happens: 
Neurons transmit information along their axon by generating action potentials. The neuron’s 
membrane is embedded with ion channels: Small proteins whose gates can open or close to allow ions 
to flow into and out of the cell. When the membrane potential6 is at or near the resting potential7 of the 
cell, such gates are mostly closed8. When the gates open, ions can flow into or out of the cell. If 
positively charged ions flow into the cell or negatively charged ions flow out, this changes the 
membrane potential to less negative or even positive values and is known as “depolarization”. The 
opposite of depolarization, i.e. when the membrane potential changes to even more negative values 
than the resting potential, is known as “hyperpolarization”. When the neuron is depolarized enough to 
reach a threshold level (threshold potential), a positive feedback process is triggered. Voltage-gated 
sodium channels open which further increases the influx of sodium ions, which depolarizes the cell 
causing more sodium channels to open and so on. When this positive feedback process is triggered an 
action potential is generated (the neuron ‘fires’ or ‘spikes’). The action potential traverses along the 
axon to the axon terminal located at the end of the axon. Immediately after the neuron has fired, the 
membrane potential drops. The neuron becomes hyperpolarized and enters a refractory period where it 
is impossible (absolute refractory period) or very difficult (relative refractory period) for the neuron to 
fire again. Shortly thereafter it returns to its resting state and is ready to fire again. At the axon terminal, 
when the action potential arrives, ion channels in the presynaptic membrane open, and calcium enters 
the cell. This causes synaptic vesicles, which are small containers carrying neurotransmitters, to release 
their neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft (the gap between the presynaptic and the postsynaptic 
cell). The neurotransmitters disperse in the synaptic cleft and bind to receptors, such as ion channels, at 
the postsynaptic cell. When a neurotransmitter binds to a gate, the gate opens, and ions can flow into 
the postsynaptic cell thereby depolarizing it (or hyperpolarizing it, in cases of inhibitory effects). If the 
postsynaptic cell reaches the threshold potential, it too will fire and so on throughout the neural 
network (Wilson 1999, Dayan & Abott 2001, Südhof 2013). 
                                                             
6 The difference in electrical potential between the interior of a neuron and its surrounding exterior (Dayan & 
Abott 2001). 
7 about -70 mv. 
8 Exceptions exist. For instance, so-called ’leaky’ channels tend to be open. 
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If this machinery of action potentials was subject to deterministic explanations, the problem of 
luck would hardly have the relevance it has today. However, this is not so. Consider the release of 
neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft. When an action potential arrives at the presynaptic terminal, 
the chance of a single synaptic vesicle to release its contents can be as low as 20% (Auger & Marty 
2000). In addition, the release of neurotransmitters from synaptic vesicles can happen even if no action 
potential arrives at the terminal at all (Dayan & Abott 2001). As a result of such observations, the release 
of neurotransmitters is commonly modelled as a stochastic process (Varela et al 1997, Tsodyks & 
Makram 1997, Abbott et al. 1997, Dayan & Abott 2001). 
Another place in the process where we find probabilities is at the opening and closing of ion 
gates. Ion channels are commonly modelled as Markov Models, which are paradigmatic cases of 
stochastic models (Colquhoun and Hawkes 1995, Werndl 2016). On this view, channels move from open 
to closed states with a certain probability. I.e. at any given moment, there is a certain probability that 
the channel will change state (Dangerfield et al. 2010, Frank & Toshinori 2015). This stochastic aspect of 
ion gates has implications for further neuroscientific phenomena and have been shown to affect both 
the spike probability and the spike timing of cells and in turn, the computations carried out by neurons 
(Schneidman et al 1998, Diba et al. 2004, Jacobson et al. 2005, Dorval 2005, Carelli et al. 2005, Kole et al. 
2006, Saarinen et al. 2008, Dudman & Nolan 2009). 
The variability of synaptic transmission and the behavior of ion channels are just two sources of 
neural ‘noise’. Noise is commonly understood as a kind of variability that results from random or 
unpredictable fluctuations (Faisal et al. 2008, McDonnell & Ward 2011). Nowadays, it is understood that 
noise, even noise at the microscopic scale, has important implications for neural activity at the higher 
‘macroscopic’ levels (Harris & Wolpert 1998, Faisal 2008, Mcdonnell & Ward 2011, Uddin 2020). One 
important role of noise concerns its role in decision-making (Hanes & Schall 1996, Hesselmann et al. 
2008). Voluntary self-initiated movements are preceded by a gradual build-up of neuronal activity (the 
readiness potential) (Kornhuber & Deecke 1965, Libet et al. 1983). This kind of gradual increase in neural 
activity preceding spontaneous movements has been found to be a common phenomenon (Romo & 
Shultz 1987, Kagaya & Takahata 2010, Fried et al 2011, Schurger et al. 2012,). For instance, the 
spontaneous decision of ‘when’ to move i.e. the decision to move now, corresponds to a threshold-
crossing neural event that can be modelled in terms of a “leaky stochastic accumulator”9 (Schurger et al. 
2012, p. E2904). On this model, ongoing neural noise is continuously bringing the neural activity closer 
                                                             
9 This has been shown in contexts with no specific temporal cue and only a general imperative to produce a 
movement at an unspecified time (Schurger et al. 2012). 




to or farther away from the threshold for acting. When the noise accumulates enough to cross the 
threshold, a decision to move ‘now’ occurs and spontaneous voluntary action takes place. On this 
account, “the precise moment […] is determined stochastically by ongoing spontaneous fluctuations in 
neural activity” (Schurger et al. 2012, p. E2909). Also then at the level of neural activity underlying 
decisions and voluntary actions, do we find neural noise and innate variability play a role. 
Here we see just three examples of the probabilities in neuroscientific explanations: In 
modelling synaptic transmission, in modelling the behavior of ion gates, and in modelling the neural 
activity underlying volitional decision-making. But exactly how such probabilities should be interpreted 
is a central question in contemporary philosophy. The three primary positions are the frequency 
interpretation, Bayesianism, and the propensity theoretical interpretation. Frequentism understands 
probability simply as the relative frequency of an event over time (Hájek 2019). It is principally 
uncommitted to any underlying metaphysics (Kendall 1949). Bayesianism is the ‘subjective’ 
interpretation of probabilities, which interpret probabilities epistemically as reflecting degrees of belief 
(de Finetti 1974, Hartmann & Sprenger 2010, Talbott 2016). The propensity theoretical interpretation 
interprets probabilities as physical dispositions, something objective and physically real similar to 
physical forces (Pierce 1931, Popper 1959, Hacking 1965, Mellor 1971, Gillies 1973, Kyberg 1974). On 
this view, chance is an ontological property of the world. As we will see in chapter 4, it will be argued 
that we have good reasons to accept a propensity theoretical interpretation of probabilities. 
 
1.3 Folk-conceptions and experimental philosophy: Why should we care? 
Intuitions play a core role in philosophy. From Gettier cases (Gettier 1963) to Frankfurt examples 
(Frankfurt 1969) to Mary’s room (Jackson 1982, 1986) and the veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971) many of 
philosophy’s most striking arguments and thought experiments derive their force from some – 
supposedly shared – intuitions. Indeed any argumentation must take something for granted for the 
conversation to take off at all. Any reason-giving game ultimately rests on a foundation that is itself 
‘groundless’ (Wittgenstein 1969). When such foundational intuitions and presuppositions are not 
shared, people are likely to talk past each other. Potential disagreements run the risk of being no more 
than semantic differences about the definitions of words. When the axiomatic presuppositions differ 
between people, how can one starting point then be justified over another? In the free will literature, a 
common approach is to appeal to folk-intuitions. Philosophers often appeal either directly to the 
intuitiveness of one particular conception of free will over another (Wolf 1990, Kane 1999, Ekstrom 
2002, Pink 2004, Baumeister 2008), or their arguments themselves appeal to the intuitive plausibility of 
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the principles from which the conclusions are derived (Frankfurt 1969, Van Inwagen 1983, Strawson 
1986, Ravizza 1994, Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Commonly, appeals to folk-intuitions are made from ‘the 
armchair’ by philosophers who tend to assume that ‘the folk’ share whichever intuitions the given 
philosopher have themselves. Unsurprisingly, this has led to conflicting ideas about what exactly 
ordinary people’s intuitions are.  
This appeal to ordinary intuitions, and the conflicting views about them, has in turn resulted in 
the new philosophical research program of experimental philosophy. What constitutes ordinary 
intuitions is an empirical question that can be examined experimentally. Experimental philosophy 
conducts experimental studies of people’s ordinary intuitions and judgments to investigate just such 
questions about ordinary intuitions (Knobe 2007, Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007, Alexander & Weinberg 
2007). Experimental philosophy covers areas in epistemology, action theory, free will, and moral 
responsibility amongst others (Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007, Knobe 2007, Knobe & Nichols 2017). Part 
of the work is focused on ‘experimental analysis’ (Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007, see also ‘proper 
foundation view’ Alexander & Weinberg 2007), where the intuitions and common-sense concepts of 
ordinary people are investigated. The aim is to determine what the laypeople’s intuitions and concepts 
really are. A second part of the work is focused on ‘experimental descriptivism’ (Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 
2007), where the focus is on how these general intuitions are generated and what kind of cognitive 
processes drive particular intuitions of the general public. 
The approach of experimental philosophy is not entirely uncontroversial, however. One 
objection is that studying folk-intuitions is irrelevant because the kind of studies that investigate these 
only ever get to surface intuitions and not robust intuitions (Kauppinen 2007). The idea is that the 
theoretical and well-trained intuitions of philosophers can be genuinely useful, but that the intuitions of 
ordinary people about philosophical matters are unreliable and irrelevant for any philosophical matters. 
As Nadelhoffer and Nahmias point out, this objection should offer an account for why philosophers’ 
intuitions are more reliable that does not beg the question (Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007, Alexander & 
Weinberg 2007). It is easy to assume that one’s own intuitions are reliable and that those who differ are 
not, but there is nothing to suggest that philosophers are any less prone to the biases of human 
psychology. Furthermore, in addition to the ordinary trap doors of human cognition philosophers are 
also at the risk of so-called ‘theory contamination’ (Goldman & Pust 1998). 
A second, more common, objection is to ask why we should care about ordinary people’s 
intuitions at all. The philosophically interesting question concerns the truth about free will, not the 




ordinary person’s judgment about it. Scientists and mathematicians don’t care about the ordinary 
person’s understanding of their subject matter – why should philosophers? 
One reason is that, unlike scientists and mathematicians, philosophers investigate their topic by 
making use of intuitions (Sommers 2010, Pust 2019). Consider the following example of philosophical 
reasoning: 
 
“The degree to which Haji’s conclusions are unintuitive must be weighed against how unintuitive 
it is to reject one or more of his premises. If a theory that uses certain principles as premises has 
components derived from these principles that are unintuitive, the principles would thereby be to some 
degree disconfirmed. It would be implausible to claim that in a theory that uses K and OW as premises, 
these principles would have a justificatory status so strong that it immunizes them against disconfirming 
pressures from their unintuitive consequences. This is true even if OW and K are conceived as axioms in 
a moral theory. One might begin with principles such as K and OW, and regard them as axioms because 
they are intuitively true and because they appear central to the theory. If the components of the theory 
derived from these principles conform to our intuitions, that would provide theoretical support for 
them. But if such derived components do not conform to our intuitions, that would to some extent 
disconfirm these principles” (Pereboom 2001, p. 144) 
 
Here, Pereboom makes explicit a common trait of philosophical reasoning that is often applied 
implicitly: If the consequences of a set of principles in question conform to our intuitions this counts as 
theoretical support in favor of these principles. If the consequences of a set of principles are unintuitive, 
this counts – to some degree – as disconfirming the principles. In this way, intuitions play a different role 
in philosophy than they do in science and mathematics. In the latter disciplines, they are important for 
generating hypotheses and positions but do not play the same role in justifying positions (but if we ask 
mathematicians to justify their axioms they might also appeal to intuitions and ideas about what is self-
evident). While traditional philosophers are happy to judge certain premises and conclusions as intuitive 
or unintuitive from the comfort of the armchair, on the basis of their own introspection and informal 
dialogues (usually with other philosophers or philosophy students), experimental philosophers take an 
empirical approach to evaluating the intuitiveness of the positions to be judged by the scale of intuitive 
conformity. 
A second reason to look at ordinary intuitions is that it is our everyday notions that are tied to 
general interests about our self-conceptions and social practices: People want to know if they have free 
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will or knowledge in the ordinary sense of these words. Though common-sense theories are unlikely to 
be successful, philosophical theories should at least be partly constrained by common-sense concepts if 
they hope to satisfy the curiosities that spark interest to begin with. Theories completely detached from 
the ordinary meanings of these words risk “having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its 
subject matter” (Mele 2001, p. 27). Philosophers should strive to not inadvertently ‘change the subject’ 
when using natural language expressions, especially when speaking about things that are of general 
interest such as the question of free will. If philosophers’ work concerns only terminological artifacts, 
one is left wondering why anyone should care about the work of philosophers to begin with. As 
Kauppinen puts it: “Why should anybody care about what philosophers do if they just argued about 
their own inventions?” (Kauppinen 2007, p. 96). Perhaps some philosophers don’t mind a cleft of apathy 
between their own work and the rest of the world, but for those of us who do, the ordinary concepts at 
the root of general interests serve as a relevant starting point for our inquiry. Certainly there is still room 
for revisionism and conceptual development - reflections should not only be constrained by intuitions 
but also be used to correct them. But revisionism needs extra justifications. For example by showing 
that folk-conceptions are confused or too imprecise for one’s purpose (Kauppinen 2007). Therefore, 
let’s start with the folk. 
One of the foundational papers in the field is Nichols’ and Knobe’s paper from 2007 (Nichols & 
Knobe 2007). There, participants were presented with two vignettes. One described a deterministic 
universe where everything is completely caused by what went before it so that when an agent decides 
to have French fries, “it had to happen that [he] would decide to have French Fries” (Nichols & Knobe 
2007, p. 669). The other described an indeterministic universe where human decision-making is not 
completely caused by what went before it so that it “did not have to happen” (Nichols & Knobe 2007, p. 
669) that an agent at a given time decided exactly as he did. After having read the vignettes, participants 
were divided into two conditions: A concrete condition and an abstract condition. In the abstract 
condition, participants were simply asked if it was possible for a person in the deterministic universe to 
be fully morally responsible10. In the concrete condition, on the other hand, the question was designed 
to invoke a greater emotional response. The results showed that in the concrete condition a majority of 
participants (72%) gave the compatibilist answer (yes), while in the abstract condition a majority (86%) 
gave the incompatibilist answer (no). In other words, people seemed to apply different concepts of free 
will based on whether they were in the abstract or concrete condition. Nichols’ and Knobe’s 
interpretation was that people had genuine incompatibilist intuitions, but that the affective component 
                                                             
10 In the early days, questions about moral responsibility was used as a proxy for intuitions about free will.  




invoked by the grizzly details of the concrete conditions made participants unable to properly apply the 
incompatibilist concept in their judgment (the affective error hypothesis) (Nichols & Knobe 2007). They 
further corroborated this interpretation by demonstrating that people were more likely to give 
compatibilist answers in response to high-affect scenarios (64%) than in response to low-affect scenarios 
(23%). When these high- and low-affect scenarios were described in an indeterministic universe, people 
gave high free will ratings regardless of the affective salience. 
In contrast to Nichols’ and Knobe’s paper, Nahmias et al. had previously conducted a similar 
vignette study, with different results (Nahmias et al. 2005). They employed two different vignettes. One 
was a scenario where a supercomputer could perfectly predict the actions of an agent by looking at the 
current state of the world (the super-computer scenario). The other was a scenario where time is turned 
back, and the universe is identically re-created over and over again with the agent acting the same way 
in every iteration (the roll-back scenario). What they found was that participants overall gave 
compatibilist answers (76%). Interestingly, Nahmias et al. checked to see if the compatibilist answers 
were driven by emotional reactions. They did so by employing scenarios where the agent performed 
blameworthy, praiseworthy, and neutral actions. Their findings revealed that in all cases the majority of 
participants gave compatibilist answers (76%, 68%, and 79% respectively). These results contradict the 
affective error hypothesis, as it cannot explain why people would give compatibilist answers in scenarios 
with low emotional valence, such as when the agent decides to go jogging. 
These are puzzling findings. Why did Nahmias et al.’s vignettes generate opposite results to 
Nichol’s and Knobe’s vignettes? What is particularly puzzling is that the studies individually have clear 
results, but these results are inconsistent with each other. If they showed mixed results on their own, 
this would indicate that laypeople simply have mixed concepts. What they show instead is that 
laypeople overwhelmingly apply one particular concept, but which concept this is differs depending on 
which study we read – despite the studies applying similar methods. Since these early studies, some 
severe methodological challenges have been demonstrated, that helps shed light on these inconsistent 
findings. These are the methodological issues known as the bypassing effect and the intrusion effect. 
These effects are two different ways in which people misunderstand determinism: The bypassing effect 
drives apparent incompatibilist answers and the intrusion effect drives apparent compatibilist answers. 
The bypassing effect is when people misinterpret deterministic descriptions to entail that the 
agent’s actions are caused by forces that bypass the agent’s conscious self. In other words, they wrongly 
interpret determinism to entail epiphenomenalism. For instance, in 2010 Nahmias and Murray reused 
the vignettes previously applied in the literature and asked participants if the agent’s decisions, wants, 
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beliefs, and past had an effect on what the agent ended up doing and if the agent had control over what 
they do (Nahmias & Murray 2010, Murray & Nahmias 2012). What they found was that people 
frequently said that an agent’s decisions, wants, and beliefs did not have an effect on the agent’s 
behaviour in deterministic universes. This clearly demonstrates an epiphenomenal reading of 
determinism. They also found an inverse relationship between free will and moral responsibility scores 
and bypassing scores. In other words, there was a strong correlation between responses that said an 
agent lacked free will and epiphenomenal readings of deterministic vignettes. Notably, they also showed 
that the bypassing effect was more prominent in abstract than in concrete conditions, and more 
common in Nichols’ and Knobe’s vignettes than in Nahmias et al.’s vignettes. Their results demonstrated 
that a majority of incompatibilist responses in previous studies were driven by this bypassing effect 
(~80%) (Nahmias & Murray 2010). When people responded that free will was impossible in deterministic 
universes, it was because they mistakenly thought mental causation was impossible in such a universe. 
These findings could then help explain why Nahmias et al.’s study and Nichols’ & Knobe’s study had 
garnered conflicting results: Because the vignettes in Nichols’ and Knobe’s study were more prone to 
invoke the bypassing effect, which led to incompatibilist results. 
When participants give incompatibilist answers, it is then not an indication that they apply the 
incompatibilist concept of free will, since they are not responses “about the incompatibility of 
determinism, understood in the way relevant to the philosophical debates, and free will” (Murray & 
Nahmias 2012, p. 15). To read determinism as entailing epiphenomenalism is an interpretation in stark 
contrast and at odds with the philosophical concept of determinism. As previously noted, most accounts 
of free will agree that it requires mental causation. When participants in these earlier studies give 
apparent incompatibilist answers, these answers are generated by participants understanding the 
deterministic descriptions differently than as philosophers intend. We might think, then, that when 
people do not misunderstand deterministic vignettes, they give compatibilist responses – or at least this 
would seem so, were it not for the intrusion effect. 
The intrusion effect is when people fail to track the deterministic component of the description 
and import indeterministic metaphysics into the scenarios: They do not properly grasp the nature of 
necessity that characterizes determinism (Rose et al. 2015). For instance, Nadelhoffer et al. tested the 
presence of intrusion by presenting participants with deterministic vignettes and asking participants if it 
was possible for the agent in the scenario to change his mind, if there was a slight chance that he would 
act differently, or if it was possible for the agent to act differently at the time (Nadelhoffer et al. 2020). 
Answering yes to these questions indicates that the participant interprets the vignette to include 




indeterministic metaphysics about the agent’s decisions and actions. Since determinism entails that with 
the exact same initial conditions an agent cannot act differently than he or she does, answering yes to 
the Nadelhoffer et al. questions shows that participants do not properly track the implications of the 
deterministic descriptions. Their results also showed that intrusion correlates with free will ratings. In 
other words, when people misinterpret determinism to include indeterministic metaphysics they are 
more likely to respond that the agent had free will. This finding problematizes the results that seem to 
show that laypeople have a compatibilist concept of free will. If participants read deterministic vignettes 
to include indeterministic metaphysics, their replies do not really reflect compatibility between 
determinism and free will – but between indeterminism and free will. Just as the bypassing effect 
problematizes findings that show apparent incompatibilist folk-conceptions, the intrusion effect 
problematizes findings that show apparent compatibilist folk-conceptions. 
Since the days of Nichol’s and Knobe’s and Nahmias et al.’s foundational papers, no consensus 
about the folk-concept of free will has emerged. In large part because of the above noted 
methodological challenges. As our starting point will be to try and establish the common-sense meaning 
of ‘free will’, we will in the next chapter try to settle this discrepancy by looking at the folk-conception of 
free will. This will be done by applying similar vignettes as those used previously in the literature but 
while controlling for both the intrusion effect and the bypassing effect. The outcome of investigating 
folk-conceptions of free will, will serve as the starting point and default concept of free will that the rest 
of the thesis builds upon. 
 
1.4 Layout of the thesis 
Collectively, the four papers that make up the chapters of this thesis aim to answer the primary research 
question - how probabilistic uncertainties in the mechanisms underlying intentional action should affect 
our understanding of free will - in the following way: 
First, by asking what does ‘free will’ mean? Despite centuries of intense focus on the problem of 
free will, the expression ‘free will’ has even today no settled-upon technical definition. Sometimes it is 
defined with reference to moral responsibility, sometimes it is defined as the ability to do otherwise, 
and there is frequent talk of ‘compatibilist’ free will and ‘libertarian’ free will as two different things. 
When we have terminological anarchy, it is tempting to adopt an ‘anything goes’ attitude where people 
are free to define the terms as they please, so long as they define them explicitly. Here, I will instead 
take a less arbitrary approach. The expression ‘free will’ is already present in natural language, but what 
kind of free will is in play there? The first paper (chapter 2) applies the approach of experimental 
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philosophy and investigates which philosophical concept best approximates the folk-conception of free 
will. In particular, I investigate if the idea of probabilistic decision-making clashes- or aligns with the folk-
conception of free will. What we find is that the folk-concept of free will is compatible with a 
probabilistic world but incompatible with a deterministic world. In other words, laypeople have an 
incompatibilist but not hard incompatibilist conception of free will. The second paper (chapter 3) 
expands upon the findings of the first experiment, by investigating if belief in physicalism or substance 
dualism affects laypeople’s concept of free will. Do physicalist beliefs drive more incompatibilist and 
hard incompatibilist conceptions of free will? What we find is that belief in physicalism appears to drive 
incompatibilist free will conceptions, but that this appearance is driven by different understandings of 
descriptions of determinism. Specifically, physicalists tend to interpret determinism to entail 
epiphenomenalism. Our findings show that, when this understanding error is corrected for, we do not 
find any differences in free will concepts driven by differences in physicalist or substance-dualist beliefs. 
The second part of the thesis asks: Is ontological indeterminism true? If free will – in the 
ordinary sense – requires ontological indeterminism we must find epistemic justifications for an 
indeterministic framework if talk of human agency as free is to be more than hopeful thinking. The third 
paper (chapter 4) asks how we should interpret the probabilities of our scientific models. Should we 
think of them as merely epistemic or do we have good reason to accept them as genuinely ontological? I 
consider three different epistemological approaches and argue that whichever approach we choose we 
have sufficient reason to accept ontological indeterminism in light of best-explanation probabilistic 
models from science. I thus argue that we can reasonably accept ontological indeterminism as true, also 
at the level of the brain and in the processes that underlie mental activity. 
The third and final part asks how we must reconceptualize free will in light of the problem of 
luck. If indeterministic randomness in human decision-making poses a problem for free will – as the 
problem of luck illustrates - what kind of control might an indeterministic agent have to alleviate this 
problem? The fourth paper (chapter 5) builds upon the common-sense notion of free will. It is argued 
that the problem of luck is ultimately unsolvable. It confronts us with a conceptual choice: We must 
either abandon the idea of free will in indeterministic agents or we must accept some element of 
randomness as part of free will. Going with the second option, I propose that ontologically 
indeterministic agents must have a way to influence their own internal probabilities for their will to be 
free. If they are able to make self-directed decisions that target and alter the agent’s own motivational 
structure, i.e. if they have the capacity for recursive decision-making, indeterministic agents gain an 
important kind of control over their internal randomness. With recursive decisions, an agent can then – 




to a certain degree – influence the indeterministic randomness innate to their decision-making. It is 
further argued that because this influence is always a matter of degrees only free will and human 
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2. Free Will Properly Understood: Folk-




Could we be free in a world where everything is strictly determined? What if the world was governed by 
chance? Philosophers disagree about these two sides of the compatibility problem, including which 
answer is more intuitive. To capture this latter part, philosophers have turned to experiments, to 
investigate whether folk-conceptions of free will are compatible with determinism. One key problem of 
such studies is that it is unclear if participants’ understanding of indeterminism reads as simply the 
absence of determinism or the concrete presence of probabilistic chances. Another common problem 
with experiments asking non-philosophers about free will and determinism is that laypeople 
misunderstand determinism: Either by inferring that it rules out mental causation (the bypassing effect) 
or by still injecting indeterminism into the description (the intrusion effect). In our experiment, using a 
within-subject design (N = 158), we control for intrusion, bypassing, and explore the understanding of 
probabilistic chance in relation to free will. We find that many participants struggled to understand the 
notion of probabilistic chance in free will. Additionally, we show that when people properly understand 
philosophically relevant concepts such as determinism, they deny that free will can exist in a 
deterministic universe but accept that free will is compatible with chance. As such, we can show with 
better clarity that laypeople are incompatibilists but not hard incompatibilists. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The question about whether free will is an illusion or not is often rooted in the idea that there is 
some universal phenomenological experience or psychological intuition, which is shared by all or nearly 
all people across time and cultures. The assumption that free will is true serves a key role in justifying 
our social and legal practices, and in shaping our self-conceptions. When asking about the reality of free 
will, what we want to know is if our intuition about free will is accurate or not: Does it correspond to 
reality or is it a cognitive trick the mind plays upon itself? (Wegner 2002). A major obstacle in the way of 
gaining any consensus on the matter is that philosophers disagree about what exactly constitutes the 




concept that is at the root of our questioning. What is the intuitive idea of free will which we should look 
for in reality? One thing most philosophers do agree upon is that free will is a particular kind of mental 
causation, where mental states and events play a key role in bringing about actions. But when it comes 
to establishing the particulars, the disagreements begin. Specifically, philosophers tend to disagree 
about whether free will can exist in a strictly deterministic universe or if it requires indeterminism. 
Determinism is the idea that causes and effects follow laws of strict necessity, so that “at any instant 
exactly one future is compatible with the state of the universe at that instant and the laws of nature” 
(Mele 2006, p. 3). Indeterminism is commonly defined as the absence of determinism. According to 
incompatibilism free will is incompatible with determinism: We cannot have free will if everything, 
including human decision-making and action, follows with strict necessity from what came before. 
According to compatibilism, on the other hand, free will is compatible with determinism. For 
compatibilists, it is unimportant whether human decisions are a consequence of a deterministic 
machinery or not. The important thing is that mental causation is real and that the agent is free from 
external force and manipulation. So long as the will is causally efficacious and the agent is not being 
manipulated, the agent has free will. 
These two positions - compatibilism and incompatibilism - constitute the two primary schools of 
thought regarding free will. But recently a third notion has found proponents. Hard incompatibilism is 
the position that free will is incompatible both with the necessity of determinism and the chanciness of 
indeterminism (Pereboom 2001, 2014a, Pereboom and Caruso 2002, Caruso 2012, 2019b). The hard 
incompatibilist notion of free will is well captured by Kastrup when he writes that “we often think – 
incoherently – of free-willed choices as neither determined nor random” (Kastrup 2020). Occasionally, a 
fourth conception of free will finds mention (O’Connor & Christopher 2020): The concept of free will 
that requires determinism to be true, i.e. only if determinism is true is free will possible (the opposite of 
incompatibilism). Let’s call this position exclusive determinism. Together, these four concepts logically 
exhaust the possible ways free will may depend upon or be excluded by determinism and indeterminism 
(fig. 1 B)11. 
The four competing free will concepts are then: 1) The incompatibilist notion of free will, which 
requires indeterministic metaphysics. 2) The compatibilist notion of free will, which has no strict 
metaphysical requirements about determinism or indeterminism. 3) The hard incompatibilist notion of 
free will, which requires that human decision-making is free from both metaphysical determinism and 
                                                             
11 Agent-causal concepts of free will are omitted from this list as these are (commonly but not necessarily) a 
branch of incompatibilism. 
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indeterminism. 4) The exclusive determinist notion of free will, which requires deterministic 
metaphysics. 
The logico-philosophical discussion about free will is at an impasse, stuck in “dialectical 
stalemates” (Murray & Nahmias 2012, p. 1) about which of these concepts deserves the name. This 
semantic tug of war has resulted in an unorthodox turn in philosophy of free will – it has made the 
intuitions of ordinary people a key focus. 
 
2.2 The turn to folk-intuitions 
To fix the object of investigation and root the endeavor in something psychologically relevant, 
many philosophers take as their starting point the concept of free will as it is commonly understood. As 
Mele puts it, a philosophical concept of free will detached from the common-sense understanding of the 
phenomenon “…runs the risk of having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter.” 
(Mele 2001, p. 27). If philosophy was “concerned only with the technical sense of the concept, it would 
be divorced from the concerns that led us to philosophical investigation of the concept in the first 
place…” (Alexander & Weinberg 2007, p. 58). 
However, philosophers disagree about which concept of free will best suits the supposedly 
common-place intuition that first gave rise to the expression.  Some philosophers claim that 
incompatibilism is most intuitive. That “Most ordinary people start out as natural incompatibilists” (Kane 
1999, p. 218), that “we come to the table, nearly all of us, as pre-theoretical incompatibilists” (Ekstrom 
2002, p. 310), and that “compatibilism is not something naturally believed, but something that has to be 
taught - by professional philosophers, in philosophy books, and through philosophy courses” (Pink 2004, 
p. 43). Others claim, on the other hand, that compatibilism is the most intuitive notion: That it “accord 
with and account for the whole set of our intuitions about responsibility” (Wolf 1990, p. 89) and that it 
corresponds “…to what laypersons generally mean when they distinguish free from unfree action” 
(Baumeister 2008, p. 14). These appeals to common-place intuitions are rooted in an attitude that the 
views that are consistent with folk-intuitions “have prima facie plausibility that the views that are 
inconsistent with folk intuitions do not” (Shultz et al. 2011, p. 1723). 
These appeals to folk-intuitions have lead philosophers to empirically investigate what the 
ordinary concept of free will is. A common approach is to apply the contrastive vignette method, where 
participants are presented with two or more descriptions of hypothetical universes which operate by 
different rules and then asked to rate whether or not agents in such universes could possess free will 




and be held morally responsible. However, four primary problems confront this research program. For 
one, it is not clear whether what is being tested is intuitions at all. It is rare to find reaction time checks 
or other methods such as the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005) to control for how reflective or 
intuitive the answers participants provide are. What is called folk-intuitions in the literature may then 
more appropriately be called folk-conceptions of free will12. Secondly, most participants are 
undergraduate students (Nichols & Knobe 2007, de Brigard et al. 2008, Preston et al. 2013, Nahmias et 
al. 2014). If we want to understand the conceptions of the general public, research should be conducted 
on a representative sample that includes participants outside academia and across ages. Thirdly, the 
experiments conducted show varying and mixed results. Some studies seem to show that folk-
conceptions fit the incompatibilist notion (Nichols 2004, 2006a, 2006b, Nichols & Knobe 2007, Sarkissian 
2010), while others appear to show that the folk-concept fits the compatibilist idea of free will 
(Monterosso et al. 2005, Nahmias et al. 2005, Nahmias 2006, Nahmias et al. 2007, Nahmias & Murray 
2010, Monroe & Malle 2010, Murray & Nahmias 2012, Monroe et al. 2014, Feltz & Cokely 2019). 
Because of this ambiguity, the semantic dispute remains unsettled: There is still no consensus on what 
the pre-theoretical folk-concept of free will is. The fourth and perhaps the biggest problem is that 
participants often misinterpret the key philosophical concepts philosophers are trying to convey. 
Specifically, they often misinterpret descriptions of determinism in two important ways known as 
bypassing and intrusion.  
The bypassing effect is when people misinterpret descriptions of determinism to entail that the 
agent’s actions are caused by forces that bypass the agent’s conscious self. In other words, they wrongly 
interpret determinism to entail epiphenomenalism13 (Nahmias & Murray 2010). There is a strong 
correlation between people misreading deterministic descriptions as entailing epiphenomenalism and 
responding that free will is impossible in such a universe. In other words, the bypassing effect has been 
found to drive apparent incompatibilist responses. ‘Apparent’ because the understanding of 
determinism that genuine incompatibilists think are at odds with free will does not exclude mental 
causation. The intrusion effect, on the other hand, is when participants fail to track the deterministic 
component of the descriptions of determinism and import indeterministic metaphysics into their 
interpretation (Nadelhoffer et al. 2020, Rose et al. 2015). When people misunderstand determinism in 
this way, they tend to ascribe free will to agents in such a universe. The intrusion effect thus drives 
                                                             
12 For this reason, we will here adopt the language use of folk-conceptions instead of speaking of intuitions. 
13 Epiphenomenalism is the idea that mental states play no causal role in the world (Robinson 2019). 
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apparent compatibilist responses. ‘Apparent’ because the understanding of determinism that 
compatibilists think is compatible with free will does not include indeterminism at any level. 
To get a proper picture of the folk-concept of free will, it is then important that studies are 
conducted on representative samples and include checks for both the bypassing and the intrusion effect 
to ensure that participants understand the key concepts in the philosophically relevant way. 
 
2.3 Aim and Hypothesis 
The general aim of this study is to contribute to the literature on folk-conceptions of free will in two 
ways, one theoretical and one methodological. 
The theoretical aim is to account for all four of the possible free will profiles people may have 
concerning free will and determinism/indeterminism, instead of limiting the focus by assuming that 
laypeople are either compatibilist or incompatibilist. Previous studies have framed indeterministic 
universes in a negative framing (i.e. as not deterministic). This is problematic for two reasons. First of all, 
understanding indeterminism in such terms depends on properly understanding determinism in the first 
place and upon being able to derive a concrete concept from the negation of determinism. Decades of 
psychological research warn against possible side effects of using negative or loss framings such as 
‘there is no x’ when testing people’s judgments and behavior (Lyengar 1990). It then seems sound to 
check whether responses would be different if the ‘non-deterministic’ universe is described as the 
absence of deterministic laws or as the presence of chance events (probabilistic laws). To avoid this 
framing problem we expand upon the existing literature by including a probabilistic description of 
indeterminism14. Secondly, when indeterminism is framed as the negation of determinism, replying that 
free will is possible in indeterministic worlds just reflects a concept of free will that is incompatible with 
determinism: An aspect that both incompatibilism and hard incompatibilism share. By examining if the 
folk-concept of free will is compatible with a probabilistic universe, we accommodate the possibility that 
laypeople are hard incompatibilists. In the free will debate, things of a probabilistic nature are 
considered random (Van Inwagen 1983, 2017, Strawson 1986, Kane 2002, Mele 2006, Roskies 2006, 
2010, Haggard 2010). Following Kastrup, we expected that folk-conceptions of free will are at odds with 
both the ideas of randomness and determinism in human decision-making. Our theoretical hypothesis 
was then that the folk-concept of free will is hard incompatibilist: That 1) people would not ascribe free 
                                                             
14 In the context of free will and ontology, the terms ’indeterminism’, ’chance’, ’randomness’, and ’probabilistic’ 
are commonly used interchangeably. This use is adopted for the purpose of this paper. 




will to agents in deterministic worlds and 2) that when indeterministic worlds are described in a 
probabilistic framing people would generally not ascribe free will to agents in such worlds. 
Additionally, the methodological aim is to accommodate the previously mentioned problems 
that have been demonstrated in the literature – especially to limit and control for both the bypassing 
and intrusion effects. Nichols’ and Knobe’s vignettes have become standard use in the literature (Nichols 
& Knobe 2007, Feltz et al. 2009, Nahmias & Murray 2010, Cova et al. 2012, Nichols & Rose 2013, Feltz & 
Cova 2014), but in their descriptions, they put special weight on human decision making as “the one 
exception” (Nichols & Knobe 2007, p. 669) in an otherwise deterministic universe. We suspect that this 
formulation causes the bypassing effect, by making participants interpret the vignette in terms of 
mental causation contra non-mental causation (epiphenomenalism). To limit the presence of bypassing 
we included explicit descriptions of mental causation in both deterministic and indeterministic vignettes 
(see section 2.4). In addition, we include controls for both the bypassing and intrusion effects. Our 
methodological hypothesis was that including explicit descriptions of mental causation in the vignettes 
would reduce the presence of bypassing so a majority of participants would avoid the bypassing effect. 
 
2.4. Methods and materials 
An online survey of 158 respondents was conducted (79 male, 78 female, 1 other15). Participants’ age 
ranged from 18-61 years with a mean age of 30.8. An a priori t-test using G*Power (Alpha = 0.05, power 
= 0.95, effect size = 0.8) was used to determine an estimated sample size of 84. Because one of the main 
aims of the study was to check for responses that weren’t cases of either bypassing or intrusion, and due 
to the high presence of bypassing and intrusion effects, a total of 173 participants were recruited. Of 
these 173 participants 15 were excluded: 3 were excluded for being duplicate participants, 1 was 
excluded for responding in a non-English language and 6 were excluded because a software error caused 
them to be presented with the same vignette twice in a row. Because the aim was to investigate the 
conceptions of laypeople i.e. people who do not have a background in academic philosophy, 4 
participants were excluded for having a Bachelor’s degree in philosophy and 1 was excluded for having a 
Master’s degree or higher in philosophy. All participants excluded by these measures were paid for their 
participation. The final sample size after exclusions was then 158 participants. 
The experiment was built and run using Qualtrics. Participants were recruited using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Mturk, n = 73) and Prolific Academic (PA, n = 90). As Mturk has mostly American users, 
                                                             
15 These were the three options available for participants. 
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and PA has mostly UK users, using both services gives a more diverse population of participants. The 
experiment lasted 11 minutes on average. Participants were paid 1.5€ (Mturk) or £1 (PA) respectively, 
corresponding to an hourly wage of approximately 7.5€. To exclude bots, participants on Mturk were 
filtered to only include users with more than 1000 completed assignments (HITs) and with a HIT 
approval rating of >99%. Because piloting of the PA users did not reveal any bots, no extra measures 
were taken to filter participants from this platform at this point in the recruitment process. Ethical 
approval was granted by the ethics committee of the School of Advanced Study at the University of 
London (SASREC_1819-313C-R). 
For the purpose of this experiment, six new vignettes were designed. Three different 
descriptions of universes described by so-called ‘rollback scenarios’ (Nahmias et al. 2005, Nadelhoffer et 
al. 2020), each with two types of decisions: A high stake and a low stake decision. The three kinds of 
universes were deterministic, indeterministic, and probabilistic. Although both the indeterministic and 
the probabilistic descriptions describe ontologically indeterministic worlds, the descriptions differ in the 
following way: The description that we here call ‘indeterministic’ mirrors the descriptions that have 
been used previously in the literature, whereas the ‘probabilistic’ description describes an 
indeterministic world such that the probabilistic aspect of indeterminism is made salient to the reader. 
The two types of decisions the agents in the vignettes make are to decide to marry their fiancé (high 
stakes) or to have fries for dinner (low stakes). The difference in stakes was included to see if people 
applied different concepts based on whether the decision was habitual and inconsequential (choosing 
fries) compared to grander deliberate life-altering decisions (marrying one’s girlfriend). Below are the 
low-stake versions of each vignette. 
 
Deterministic vignette (low-stake) 
“Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused by whatever 
happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so what happened in the 
beginning of the universe caused what happened next, and so on right up until the present. 
 
In this universe human decision making is caused by mental states such as beliefs, desires and 
intentions. These beliefs, desires and intentions are still completely caused by what came before them. 
So that if everything in the past from the beginning of the universe was exactly the same, then every 
belief, desire and intention that a person has in this universe had to occur exactly as they did. 
 




For example one day Louis decides to have French Fries for lunch. Like everything else, this decision was 
completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same 
up until Louis made his decision, then it had to happen that Louis would decide to have French Fries at 
that point in time. If time was turned back over and over again, to the exact same moment just before 
Louis made his decision, then it had to happen that he would decide to have French Fries at that 
moment every time.” 
 
Indeterministic vignette (low-stake) 
“Imagine a universe (Universe B) in which everything that happens is not completely caused by 
whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so what happens in 
the present of the universe is not completely caused by what happened before it, and so on into the 
future. 
 
In this universe human decision making is influenced by mental states such as beliefs, desires and 
intentions. These beliefs, desires and intentions are still not completely caused by what came before 
them. So that even if everything in the past from the beginning of the universe was exactly the same, 
then every belief, desire and intention that a person has in this universe did not have to occur as they 
did. 
 
For example one day Karl decides to have French Fries for lunch. Like everything else, this decision was 
not completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the 
same up until Karl made his decision, then it did not have to happen that Karl would decide to have 
French Fries. If time was turned back over and over to the exact same moment just before Karl made his 
decision, then it did not have to happen that he would decide to have French Fries at that moment 
every time.” 
 
Probabilistic vignette (low-stake) 
“Imagine a universe (Universe C) in which everything that happens is a matter of probabilities, with no 
potential outcome having a 100% of a 0% chance of happening. This is true from the very beginning of 
the universe, so that what happens in the present of the universe is a matter of probabilities, and so on 
into the future. 
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In this universe human decision making is influenced by mental states such as beliefs, desires and 
intentions. These beliefs, desires and intentions are still a matter of probabilities. So that even if 
everything in the past from the beginning of the universe was exactly the same, then every belief, desire 
and intention that a person has in this universe had a specific probability of occurring as they did. 
 
For example one day Peter decides to have French Fries for lunch. Like everything else, this decision was 
a matter of probabilities. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up until Peter made his 
decision, then there was a certain probability that Peter would decide to have French Fries at that point 
in time. If time was turned back over and over again, to the exact same moment just before Peter made 
his decision, then some of the times he would decide to have French Fries at that moment, and some of 
the times he would decide to have salad at that moment.” 
 
For the high-stake descriptions, the last paragraph was exchanged with a similarly worded paragraph 
describing the agent deciding to marry his girlfriend (see supplementary notes 1). All of the scenarios 
were deliberately designed to be non-moral scenarios (see section 2.6 for a discussion of this). 
The experiment consisted of a within-subject design. Each participant read a consent form, a set 
of instructions, and was assigned at random to one of two experimental conditions (Fig. 1, A). In both 
conditions, participants were presented with two vignettes, presented in a random order. In condition 1 
(determinism-indeterminism) participants were presented with one deterministic vignette and one 
indeterministic vignette. In condition 2 (determinism-probability) participants were presented with one 
deterministic vignette and one probabilistic vignette. Each vignette randomly included either a high 
stake or a low stake decision. 
After reading the first vignette, participants were asked: ”In Universe [x], is it possible to have 
free will?”. Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert-type scale (from -3: ’No’ to 3: ’Yes’, with the 
intermediate 0: ’Don’t Know’. For a discussion of this, see section 2.6). Participants were then asked to 
provide reasons for their answers. After this, they had to answer a list of understanding questions 
before moving on to the second vignette, where the procedure was repeated. The understanding 
questions were questions about whether or not mental states had causal effects in the described 
universe and whether or not the agent could have done otherwise (see supplementary notes 2). By 
presenting participants with 2 vignettes, we were able to map out their fully-fledged free will profiles.  




For statistical analysis of graded data, student’s t-test was used when sample sizes are equal and 
Welch’s t-test was used when sample sizes are unequal. For the binary coded data, logistic regression 
was used to analyze the data. 
 
2.5 Results 
66 participants were assigned to the determinism-indeterminism condition, 92 participants were 
assigned to the determinism-probability condition. The different number of people in the two conditions 
Fig. 1 A. Experimental design. The procedure of the experiment was as follows: Participants are allocated either to the 
determinism-indeterminism condition or the determinism-probability condition. After that, they are presented with 1 
vignette chosen at random and then asked to rate if it is possible to have free will in the described universe. They are then 
asked to explain their rating and asked understanding questions. Afterwards, they are presented with the 2nd vignette and 
the procedure is repeated. B. Response pattern of free will profiles. Show how free will responses to the different 
vignettes map onto the different concepts of free will. C. Determinism Understanding. Show the percentage of 
participants that committed bypassing, intrusion, responded ‘don’t know’, and properly understood the deterministic 
vignette. D. Stage 2 Free Will Ascriptions. Shows the free will ascription to the three different descriptions (deterministic, 
indeterministic, and probabilistic) when no understanding errors are present. (This graph omits 1 response in the ‘don’t 
know’ category). Error bars reflect confidence intervals. 
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was due to the varying presence of understanding errors16. While collecting data, partial analysis was 
run to check for the presence of bypassing and intrusion effects without analyzing free will ratings. 
Because understanding errors were more present in the determinism- probability condition, it was 
necessary to recruit extra participants for this condition to reach the minimum goal of at least a 42/42 
split of responses with no understanding errors present. This reflects the fact that participants had a 
harder time understanding the vignettes in the determinism-probabilistic condition than in the 
determinism-indeterminism condition (for a discussion of this, see section 2.6). 
To evaluate the effects of bypassing and intrusion, we processed the data in three different 
screening stages: Stage (1) included all responses to vignettes without accounting for understanding 
errors, as is commonly done in previous studies (Monterosso et al. 2005, Nahmias et al. 2005, Nichols & 
Knobe 2007, Sarkissian 2010). Stage (2) included only responses to vignettes where the metaphysics had 
been sufficiently well understood. Understanding questions were scored and responses where an 
understanding error was detected were excluded from the analysis (see supplementary notes 3). Stage 
(3) included only the responses of those participants who had properly understood the metaphysics of 
both vignettes they were presented with. 
At every stage the data was processed in two ways: As graded data as collected via Likert-like scale 
responses, and as binary data (-3 to -1 coded as ‘no’, 1 to 3 coded as ‘yes’ and ‘0’ coded as don’t know). 
An order-effect was found with the probabilistic vignette at stage 1 of the analysis (paired t(67) = -2.1, p 
< .05) but it disappeared in stages 2 and 3. At no point in the analysis did we find any effect of stake or 
any effect of response-time (measured with reaction times). 
 
Stage 1: All responses without understanding restrictions 
When not controlling for understanding errors, 31.7% of participants ascribed free will to agents in 
deterministic worlds (N = 158, M = -1.10, SD = 2.09). 89.3% ascribed free will to agents in indeterministic 
worlds (n = 66, M = 2.2, SD = 1.50). And 61.9% ascribed free will to agents in probabilistic worlds (n = 92, 
M = 0.81, SD = 2.13) (Fig. 2, A and B). 
Replies from participants in the determinism-indeterminism condition were significantly more 
prone to ascribing free will to indeterministic worlds than to deterministic worlds (paired t(65) = -8.5, p 
< .001; logistic regression, p < .001). Similarly, replies from participants in the determinism- probability 
condition also showed a significant difference in free will attribution, with a lower score in deterministic 
worlds (paired t(91) = -6.6, p < .001; logistic regression, p < .001). Importantly, when comparing free will 
                                                             
16 Bypassing, intrusion, and conditionalizing (see section 2.6) 




ratings to the indeterminism vignettes from the determinism-indeterminism condition with free will 
ratings to the probabilistic vignettes in the determinism- probability condition, a significant difference 
was also found, with free will ascribed less often to agents in probabilistic worlds (Welch t(156) = 4.8, p 
< .001; logistic regression, p < .001).  
 
Stage 2: Responses when excluding misunderstandings 
Of the participants with at least 1 response that passed the understanding check, 24 were male, 25 
female, and 1 other. Their age ranged from 18-54 years with a mean age of 29.3 years. When controlling 
for understanding errors we were left with 50 responses to deterministic vignettes (~68% loss) (Fig. 1, 
C), 46 responses to the indeterministic vignettes (~30% loss), and 43 responses to probabilistic vignettes 
(~53% loss). 
Among these replies, 42.0% rated the agent to have free will in deterministic worlds (N = 50, M 
= -0.5, SD = 2.30), 89.1% rated agents to have free will in indeterministic worlds (N = 46, M = 2.2, SD = 
1.40) and 90.7% rated agents to have free will in probabilistic worlds (N = 43, M = 2.0, SD = 1.30) (Fig. 2, 
C and D). 
Comparing the responses from the determinism-indeterminism condition again showed 
significantly higher free will scores in response to indeterministic worlds than to deterministic worlds 
(Welch t(82) = -7.0, p < .001; logistic regression, p < .001). Similarly, responses from the determinism- 
probability condition also showed a significant difference in free will attribution, with a lower score in 
deterministic worlds (Welch t(79) = -6.6, p < .001; logistic regression, p < .001). However, when 
comparing free will ratings from the indeterministic vignettes to the free will ratings from the 
probabilistic vignettes, the difference between these free will ratings was no longer significant (Welch 
t(87) = 0.6, p > .05; logistic regression, p > .05).  
 
Stage 3: Complete free will profiles of participants 
To get a picture of the fully-fledged free will profiles of participants, an analysis was run on responses 
from participants who understood both vignettes they were presented with in the philosophically 
relevant ways (n = 31, 15 male, 15 female, 1 other). Their age ranged from 20-48 years, with a mean age 
of 28.5 years. 
Among these, 28.9% rated the agent to have free will in deterministic worlds (n = 31, M = -1.16, 
SD = 2.06), 81.25% rated agents to have free will in indeterministic worlds (n = 16, M = 1.9, SD = 2.01) 
and 93.3% rated agents to have free will in probabilistic worlds (n = 15, M = 2.53, SD = 1.06). Having 
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participants who properly understood both vignettes gives us the opportunity to look at their full free 
will profiles when no understanding errors take place. Of these 31 participants, 2 had hard 
incompatibilist conceptions (6.5%), 20 had incompatibilist conceptions (64.5%), 7 had compatibilist 
conceptions (22.5%) and 2 had exclusive determinists conceptions (6.5%). 
 
2.6 Discussion 
Our study showed two primary results. One related to the theoretical hypothesis and one related to the 
methodological hypothesis. 
The first result relates to our theoretical hypothesis and the empirical stalemate on folk-
conceptions of free will. Our study shows that the folk-concept of free will is apparent hard 
incompatibilist, but that this appearance is caused by participants’ misinterpreting probabilistic 
descriptions as entailing either 1) epiphenomenalism or 2) a conditional ability to do otherwise. At first 
Fig. 2 Results as binary data. A. Shows the distribution of responses from the determinism-indeterminism condition at 
stage 1 of the analysis.  B. Shows the distribution of responses from the determinism-probability condition at stage 1 of the 
analysis. C. Shows the distribution of responses from the determinism-indeterminism condition at stage 2 of the analysis. 
D. Shows the distribution of responses from the determinism-probability condition at stage 2 of the analysis. Error bars 
reflect confidence intervals. 
 




glance, we do find that laypeople ascribe free will significantly less frequently to agents in the 
probabilistic vignettes than to agents in the indeterministic vignette (stage 1). It would then seem that 
making the probabilistic aspect of indeterminism salient does indeed interfere with folk-conceptions of 
free will, such that they reveal themselves to be hard incompatibilists. However, this is only true when 
we do not control for understanding mistakes. Interestingly, a large number of participants 
misinterpreted the probabilistic vignettes to entail a conditional ability to do otherwise (31.5%). Here, 
we call this interpretation conditionalizing. In philosophy, indeterminism entails an unconditional ability 
to do otherwise whereas the conditional ability to do otherwise is related to determinism. 
Conditionalizing may then be seen as reflecting a deterministic (but not epiphenomenal) interpretation. 
Since a conditional reading of the probabilistic vignettes does not reflect an indeterministic 
interpretation as intended, the occurrence of conditionalizing was filtered as an understanding error 
(except in response to deterministic vignettes, where it reflects the philosophically accurate 
interpretation). When controlling for participants’ understanding errors, the difference between free 
will ratings to indeterministic and probabilistic vignettes disappeared (stage 2). This reveals that people 
are only apparent hard incompatibilists. The apparent hard incompatibilist responses from stage 1 
analysis thus do not reflect actual hard incompatibilist conceptions, but rather the fact that people don’t 
as often interpret probabilistic descriptions as entailing an unconditional ability to do otherwise. When 
the probabilistic descriptions are correctly interpreted to include mental causality and an unconditional 
ability to do otherwise, any difference in free will ascriptions to agents in probabilistic and 
indeterministic vignettes disappears. Our results thus do not garner support for Kastrup’s notion that we 
sometimes think of free will as non-random, at least regarding the kind of probabilistic randomness17 
that is a common focus in the free will literature (Van Inwagen 1983, 2017, Strawson 1986, Kane 2002, 
Mele 2006, Roskies 2006, 2010, Haggard 2010). Indeed, when looking at the fully-fledged free will 
profiles of participants who properly understood both vignettes they were presented with, only 6.5% (2 
of 31) gave hard incompatibilist responses. Instead, our study shows that when laypeople understand 
the philosophically relevant concepts as philosophers intend them (a core assumption of the contrastive 
vignette method), they generally apply the incompatibilist concept of free will. This finding provides us 
with the first block of evidence to break the empirical stalemate about folk-conceptions of free will. 
Commonly, bypassing and intrusion effects have been used to problematize findings of previous studies, 
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 By talk of ’probabilistic randomness’ we do not mean to allude to any particular alternative notion of 
randomness, but only to express openness to the idea that others may conceptualize randomness differently than 
the technical conception common in philosophy. 
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with bypassing problematizing incompatibilist findings and intrusion problematizing compatibilist 
findings. For instance, Nadelhoffer et al. show that compatibilist results, in particular those of Nahmias 
et al. 2005, can be explained by the presence of intrusion effects. But this just shows us that the results 
of the previous literature are driven by such effects, it does not show us which concept is at play when 
neither effect is present. For instance, it could be the case that although the compatibilist results of 
previous studies were driven by intrusion effects, laypeople would continue to give compatibilist 
answers when no intrusion or bypassing was present. The results presented here are the first to show 
which folk-concept of free will is in place behind the veil of common misunderstandings – i.e. when 
neither intrusion, bypassing, nor conditionalizing is present – and that it is incompatibilism. With this, 
we have the first block of evidence to show that after the mistake of bypassing is corrected, 
incompatibilism remains the dominant folk-conception. In 2005 Nahmias et al. noted about rollback 
scenarios that “such scenarios can also be varied to test whether indeterminism (e.g., one decision 
occurs half the time and another occurs half the time) increases or decreases participants’ judgment of 
free will and moral responsibility.“ (Nahmias et al. 2005, p. 574). The present study is a first step 
towards testing whether such probabilistic considerations influence judgments of free will. However, we 
did not check for particular probability distributions such as a 50/50 chance. Further research is needed 
to determine if particular distributions influence participants’ free will rating, and where the line lies – if 
there is one – between freedom-undermining randomness and non-random probabilities. 
The second result is that even when vignettes include clear explicit descriptions of mental 
causation, about half of laypeople still interpret determinism to entail epiphenomenalism (49.4%). This 
demonstrates the strong prevalence and power of the bypassing effect. The strong presence of 
bypassing, despite including explicit descriptions of mental causation in the vignettes, has several 
possible explanations. First of all, it could reflect a problem with the design of the vignettes themselves. 
One thing of notice is the long length of the vignettes. Perhaps vignettes of this length are more 
cognitively demanding to read, causing participants to overlook the explicit description of mental 
causation and thereby drive the high presence of bypassing. However, a majority of participants 
understood the indeterministic vignettes perfectly fine, so it is unlikely that the effect can be explained 
entirely in terms of length and cognitive demand18. We also checked for a correlation between 
participants’ level of education and the understanding scores of participants – if reading comprehension 
was a factor we should expect higher levels of education to correlate with a better understanding score, 
                                                             
18 Using the flesh reading ease score our vignettes had a score of 57.9 (deterministic), 60 (indeterministic), and 
51.5 (probabilistic). This corresponds to a difficulty level appropriate for 10-12th graders.  




but we found no such correlation. Furthermore, where previous studies have shown effects of vignette 
length on free will ratings longer vignettes drive compatibilist responses (Nichols & Knobe 2007), and 
the bypassing effect drives incompatibilist responses. For these reasons, we find it unlikely that the 
strong presence of bypassing can be explained in terms of reading fluency, length of vignettes, or 
cognitive demand. 
 Defenders of compatibilism may point to another explanation for why the bypassing effect is so 
persistent: Perhaps it is because the folk-concept of free will is more about the 
epiphenomenalism/mental causation distinction instead of the determinism/indeterminism distinction. 
Nahmias et al. write that “if it takes a basic incompatibilist argument to make incompatibilism ‘the 
intuitive view’, then it seems that it is the incompatibilist who are talking the folk into incompatibilism” 
(Nahmias et al. 2005, p. 576). Similarly, they may argue that if it takes a basic learning process to make 
people think of free will as something related to indeterminism, then it is not compatibilists who talk the 
folk out of anything, but incompatibilists whose position must be learned, “taught - by professional 
philosophers, in philosophy books, and through philosophy courses” (Pink 2004, p. 43). Perhaps 
metaphysics is unintuitive and difficult, which would make it difficult to see how any concept with strict 
and nuanced ontological commitments could correspond to folk-conceptions of anything. Perhaps the 
ideas of indeterminism and determinism are themselves unintuitive and require a bit of learning to think 
(or intuit) about. It has, for instance, been shown that belief in free will is more closely related to beliefs 
in mind-body dualism than to belief in indeterminism (Wisniewski et al. 2019). 
 Although we agree that common-sense views of free will may be more closely tied to the ideas 
of substance dualism, mental causation, and epiphenomenalism, our results here show that it 
nevertheless remains the case that when people properly understand the concept of determinism,  it 
clashes with their ordinary idea of free will. If determinism was intuitively irrelevant, it would indeed 
also be odd why philosophers have been so preoccupied with this part of metaphysics in the first place. 
As such, compatibilists should have to provide further reasons for why we should accept to call their 
concept free will when it is exactly what everyone else means by unfree will when they understand the 
implications of determinism. 
 Furthermore, the bypassing measure we apply here has been criticized for being overly 
sensitive. Björnsson and Pereboom propose that the bypassing effect may, in fact, be a ‘throughpass’ 
effect, where participants understand the mental states to be part of the causal structure but answer 
bypassing questions in the negative because they don't view these mental states as being the ‘ultimate 
difference-maker’ (Björnsson 2014, Björnsson and Pereboom 2016). Indeed, they conducted a study 
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that shows that most people who are apparent bypassers agree with a throughpass interpretation of 
deterministic vignettes. Those who appear to commit bypassing may then in fact not apply an 
epiphenomenalist reading after all. Here, we do not control for throughpass interpretation of the 
bypassing questions. However, since our vignettes explicitly include mention that beliefs, desires, and 
intentions affect human decision-making, and our bypass measure asks if these states have an effect on 
what a person does, our bypassing measure here doubles as a standard attention check. Furthermore, 
the bypassing/throughpass effect drives incompatibilist responses, so if our bypassing measure is overly 
sensitive and filters out non-epiphenomenal readings as epiphenomenal, we are likely filtering out real 
incompatibilist as ‘apparent’ incompatibilists. This would make our results that laypeople have 
incompatibilist conceptions more surprising. If many of our apparent bypassers are in fact genuine 
incompatibilists, then the real proportion of genuine incompatibilists is likely higher than what we find 
here. 
 In this experiment, we used exclusively non-moral vignettes. While it is common to find moral 
vignettes applied in the literature, we decided against it here because more emotionally salient 
vignettes have been shown results and result in more cases of intrusion (see Nichols & Knobes 2007, but 
for an exception see Nahmias et al. 2005, also Rose et al. 2015, and Nadelhoffer 2020). Keeping in line 
with the ‘performance error’ hypothesis (Nichols & Knobe 2007), which holds that strong affective 
reactions can bias and distort peoples’ responses, and wanting to avoid invoking affective errors, we 
used exclusively non-moral vignettes. Proponents of the ‘affective competence’ hypothesis (Nichols & 
Knobe 2007), which on the contrary holds that the effects of strong affective reactions are not errors, 
might object that omitting moral vignettes our study ‘stacks the deck’ in favor of incompatibilist results. 
The lack of moral dimensions is a clear limitation of this study, and it would be interesting to see if the 
previously demonstrated discrepancies between responses to vignettes that evoke higher or lower 
emotional reactions remain when controlling for understanding errors, or if these previous findings are 
caused entirely by emotional salience being a source of intrusion. Further research is needed to 
investigate if this discrepancy remains when appropriate understanding controls are in place.  
Regarding the 7-point Likert-type scale used here, our scale was only partially labeled (in 
contrast to fully-labeled scales commonly used in the literature). Though the effects of different scales 
and labeling approaches are a well-studied phenomena results are mixed (Andrews 1984, , Lau 2007, 
Weijters et al. 2010, Moors et al. 2014, Lewis 2019). Here, we ultimately decided to go with partial 
labeling which may reduce acquiescent response bias at the risk of resulting in more extreme response 
bias (Weijters et al. 2010). Another point that warrants discussion concerns the uneven recruitment of 




participants for the two conditions. We recruited 66 participants for the determinism-indeterminism 
condition and 92 for the determinism-probability condition. While such a distribution is unorthodox, the 
purpose of this study was to check for responses to vignettes where no understanding errors were 
present. Based on a priori power testing, we needed at least 42 responses to each vignette. Because a 
high presence of bypassing and intrusion effect was expected, we ran understanding checks on the data 
while testing – but without doing any analysis of free will ratings – to ensure that we ultimately had 
enough responses without bypassing, intrusion, or conditionalizing effects for a meaningful analysis. 
These continued understanding checks revealed that to achieve the required sample size of at least 42 
responses to probabilistic vignettes without any understanding errors, it was necessary to recruit more 
participants for the determinism-probability condition. This reflects the fact that understanding the 
probabilistic vignettes as intended was more difficult compared to the indeterministic vignette (see 
section 2.5). 
Furthermore, it is possible that by presenting the two vignettes one after the other instead of 
both at once, the design does not successfully test intuitions. Perhaps participants answer intuitively to 
the first vignette, but more reflectively to the second vignette. However, if this was the case, we should 
expect to see an order effect. No order effects were found at stages 2 and 3. Similarly, we should expect 
a difference in free will ratings based on reaction times, with slower reaction times being indicative of 
more reflective i.e. less intuitive answers. However, no effects based on reaction times were found. 
Additionally, as noted previously (section 2.1), it is dubious whether previous research successfully taps 
into intuitions as such, which is also why we in this paper talk of folk-conceptions more generally instead 
of folk-intuitions. 
 Finally, as part of the understanding check participants were asked whether an agent ‘could 
have done otherwise’. In the free will literature, this is a controversial phrase. Compatibilists frequently 
argue that ‘could have done otherwise’ is best understood in the conditional sense. Here, we control for 
this particular interpretation. The possible answers to the ‘could have done otherwise’-question include 
the options ‘only if her beliefs and desires had been different’ and ‘yes, even if her beliefs and desires 
were exactly the same’19. This explicitly gives participants the option to choose either the conditional or 
the unconditional interpretation of the wording. 
 
                                                             
19 For the exact framing of the question and the other options for answering see supplementary notes 2. 




Our study examined whether probabilistic randomness clashes with the common-sense notion of free 
will. We did not find any support for this hypothesis. Indeed, only a minority (6.5%) of participants who 
passed the understanding checks gave hard incompatibilist responses. However, we did discover a new 
kind of understanding error common for probabilistic vignettes. We call it conditionalizing: Interpreting 
indeterministic descriptions as including a conditional instead of an unconditional ability to do 
otherwise. On investigating the relationship between probabilistic randomness and common-sense 
notions of free will, our study is only a first step. There may be particular thresholds where specific 
probability distributions affect attributions of free will in indeterministic universes when such worlds are 
framed as the presence of probabilistic chance events and not simply as the absence of determinism. 
Nevertheless, we have shown that when controlling for the common understanding errors such as 
bypassing and intrusion effects, folk-conceptions of free will are incompatibilist. By controlling for these 
effects, we get a view of what the folk-conception of free will is when laypeople properly understand 
the philosophically relevant concepts, and that when this is the case laypeople are mostly 
incompatibilists. This comes as a challenge for those holding that compatibilism aligns with the 
common-sense notion of free will: They will have to show that there are cases where laypeople 
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Belief in substance dualism – the idea that the mind and the mental is its own kind of substance, distinct 
from the physical – is a strong predictor of free will beliefs. Why? Here, we show that reduced belief in 
substance dualism appears to drive differences in free will conceptions. Specifically, we investigate if 
more physicalist beliefs – a particular kind of substance monism - drive incompatibilist and hard 
incompatibilist conceptions of free will. Using a within-subject design (N = 185), we find that people with 
more physicalist beliefs ascribe free will less often to agents in deterministic worlds, and thus appear to 
be more incompatibilist than their dualist counterparts. However, we show that this difference is not 
driven by a genuine difference in free will conceptions, but rather by differences in the 
(mis)understanding of deterministic descriptions: Physicalists interpret determinism as excluding mental 
causation. When this understanding error is controlled for, physicalists do not appear more 
incompatibilist – or hard incompatibilist – than dualists. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Is the presence of probabilistic chance a problem for the physical mind? One of the most oft-discussed 
aspects of the free will debate, is whether free will is compatible with determinism or not, I.e. whether 
free will is compatible with the idea that at any instant only one future is compatible with the state of 
the universe at that instant and the laws of nature (Mele 2006). A more recent addition to this 
discussion is the question of whether the presence of probabilistic chance is compatible with free will. 
Born writes that “if you believe in perfect freedom you will get into difficulties again, because you 
cannot neglect the laws of statistics which are laws of nature” (Born 1949, p. 127), with Cassirer “it does 
not matter in this case whether one thinks of the causality governing nature in the form of strict 
dynamic laws, or of mere statistical laws. […] neither the one nor the other path leaves an opening for 
that sphere of freedom which ethics claims for itself” (Cassirer 1956, p 209), and Roskies writes that 
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“Randomness as the cause of action is as difficult to reconcile with a notion of freedom of the will […] as 
is determinism” (Roskies 2006). 
However, it has been suggested that the focus on these compatibility questions is misguided 
and that the real threat to free will is instead reductionism and substance-monism: The idea that 
everything is fundamentally one substance (Nahmias 2006, Roskies 2006, Montague 2008, Cashmore 
2010). Though there are many kinds of substance monism, such as neutral monism (Spinoza 1677), and 
idealism (Berkeley 1710), the most common form of monism in contemporary philosophy is physicalism 
(Bourget & Chalmer 2013). According to physicalism, everything is made of (or the result of) physical 
‘stuff’, i.e. matter and the physical laws of nature (Tse 2011, Stoljar 2017). In contrast, substance-
dualism is the idea that the mind and mental states consist of their own particular kind of substance; an 
immaterial, non-physical substance (Descartes 1641). Studies focusing on the relationship between free 
will and substance dualism show two seemingly inconsistent results. On the one hand, studies show that 
the ordinary concept of free will is not committed to any substance-dualist metaphysics (Monroe and 
Malle 2010, Monroe et al. 2014, Mele 2014, Nahmias et al. 2014, Vonasch et al. 2018,). On the other 
hand, belief in substance dualism better predicts belief in free will than (dis)belief in determinism does 
(Forstmann & Burgmer 2018, Wisniewski et al. 2019). These are odd findings. Why is belief in substance 
dualism a strong predictor of belief in free will if the ordinary free will concept is not committed to this 
kind of metaphysics? Furthermore, Wisniewski et al. found that belief in determinism increased free will 
belief amongst the more dualist participants, but decreased free will beliefs amongst monists in their 
western population20. 
Here, we investigate why belief in substance dualism might predict free will beliefs. It has been 
suggested that scientists, besides being physicalists, also tend to be hard incompatibilists (Shadlen & 
Roskies 2012). I.e. they think that not only is determinism a problem for free will, but that 
indeterminism is detrimental for our potential to have free will as well (Pereboom 2001, 2014a, 
Pereboom and Caruso 2002, Shadlen & Roskies 2012, Caruso 2012, 2019b). Here, we focus on the 
physicalist notion of substance monism and test both whether more physicalist beliefs drive 1) 
differences in free will conceptions and 2) differences in the understanding of the related metaphysics of 
determinism and indeterminism. We consider three different free will concepts: Incompatibilism, 
compatibilism, and hard incompatibilism. Incompatibilism is the notion that free will requires ontological 
indeterminism. Compatibilism on the contrary holds that no such metaphysical requirement is necessary 
                                                             
20
 The inverse relationship between determinism and free will beliefs was true for western participants only. For 
eastern participants, determinism was positively correlated with free will beliefs in both dualist and monist 
participants (Wisniewski et al. 2019). 
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for our potential to have free will. While most research on free will intuitions focuses exclusively on 
these two conceptions, we here include the position of hard incompatibilism. As previously noted, hard 
incompatibilism is the notion that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. 
Differences in free will conceptions can explain differences in free will beliefs. If more physicalist 
beliefs drive incompatibilist and hard incompatibilist free will conceptions, this would explain why belief 
in substance-dualism predicts belief in free will: Physicalists believe free will is impossible if determinism 
is true (incompatibilism) or even that free will is impossible regardless of whether determinism or 
indeterminism is true (hard incompatibilism), whereas dualists believe that free will is possible 
regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is true (compatibilism). If this is the case, we 
should expect physicalists to be less inclined to believe in free will if they believe the world is 
deterministic or even if they believe the world is indeterministic. 
In addition, physicalism may drive different interpretations of the concept of determinism. 
Studies show that people often misinterpret determinism (Nahmias & Murray 2010, Rose et al. 2015, 
Nadelhoffer et al. 2020). In particular, laypeople struggle to understand the philosophical notion of 
determinism in two different ways.  The first interpretation challenge is known as the bypassing effect, 
whereby participants misunderstand determinism to exclude mental causation (i.e. to entail 
epiphenomenalism21) (Nahmias & Murray 2010). The second interpretation challenge is the intrusion 
effect, where participants intrude indeterminism into their interpretation of determinism (Rose et al. 
2015, Nadelhoffer et al. 2020). These different understanding errors can also explain part of the results 
from Wisniewski et al., and it has indeed been shown that different beliefs about substance dualism and 
substance monism drive different interpretations of determinism (Forstmann & Burgmer 2018). Since 
intrusion drives high free will ratings and bypassing drives low free will ratings, if dualists have an 
intrusionist understanding of determinism and physicalists have a bypassing understanding, this could 
explain why determinism increases free will beliefs amongst dualists but reduce it amongst monists. 
The general aim of this study is to contribute to the literature on folk-conceptions of free will by 
investigating if- and how differing beliefs in substance dualism or physicalism affect people’s concept of 
free will. We hypothesize that 1) belief in physicalism leads to more incompatibilist and hard 
incompatibilist conceptions of free will, I.e. physicalist participants will ascribe free will less often to 
agents in deterministic worlds and to agents in worlds where indeterminism is described as the 
presence of probabilistic chance (in contrast to the mere absence of determinism), and 2) That belief in 
physicalism leads to more bypassing effects and that more dualist beliefs lead to more intrusion effects, 
                                                             
21 Epiphenomenalism is the idea that mental states play no causal role in the world (Robinson 2019). 
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i.e. physicalists will tend to interpret deterministic descriptions as entailing epiphenomenalism whereas 
dualist participants will interpret deterministic descriptions as including indeterministic metaphysics. 
 
3.2 Methods and materials 
An online survey of 185 participants was conducted. Part of the participants was recruited via Prolific 
Academic (n = 96) and part of the participants was recruited via email (n = 89). Email recruitment was 
used to recruit scientists in order to gain a more physicalist sample. Due to a software error, gender data 
was only available for the participants recruited via prolific academic of whom 41 were female, 48 were 
male and 7 were unknown/preferred not to say. Participants’ ages were in the range of 18-24 to above 
65 years with a median range of 25-34 years. An a priori t-test using G*Power (Alpha = 0.05, power = 
0.95, effect size = 0.8) was used to determine a minimum sample size of 84. Because the aim was to 
investigate conceptions of non-philosophers, 8 participants were excluded for having a background in 
philosophy (a Bachelor’s degree or higher). Furthermore, 18 participants were excluded for failing an 
English language test presented at the beginning of the experiment, and 27 participants were excluded 
for failing an attention check (the ‘eye-color’ attention check, see later this section. See also 
supplementary notes 4). The final sample size after exclusions was then 132 participants. The 
experiment was built and run using JavaScript and lasted 12 minutes on average. Participants recruited 
from Prolific Academic were paid 1£. Participants recruited via mail received no payment for their 
participation. Ethical approval was granted by the ethics committee of the School of Advanced Study at 
the University of London (SASREC_1819-313C-R). 
 For this experiment, three different vignettes were designed describing three different worlds. 
The three kinds of worlds were ‘deterministic’, ‘indeterministic’, and ‘probabilistic’. The difference 
between the indeterministic and probabilistic world is that the one we here call indeterministic 
describes determinism simply as the absence of determinism (i.e. ‘if the same event happens at two 
different times, then the very same effect may or may not follow’), whereas the probabilistic description 
describes indeterminism as the presence of probabilistic chances. All descriptions include an explicit 
description of mental causation. One of the primary goals of the vignettes was to make the descriptions 
as easy to read and understand as possible, to reduce the presence of understanding errors compared 
to vignettes previously employed in the literature. Below are the three vignettes. 
 
Deterministic vignette (low-stake) 
“Please carefully read the text below. You will have to answer questions about it. 
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Imagine the following world: In this world, people are not puppets. What they do is caused by what they 
think, feel and decide. 
 
In this world, everything follows strictly from cause-and-effect. Everything is strictly caused by what 
happened before. If the same event happens at two different times, then the very same effect follows. 
 
One day, in this world, John decides to marry his girlfriend Laura. Like everything else, this decision was 
completely caused by what happened before it.” 
 
Indeterministic vignette (low-stake) 
“Please carefully read the text below. You will have to answer questions about it. 
Imagine the following world: In this world, people are not puppets. What they do is caused by what they 
think, feel and decide. 
 
In this world, everything follows partly from cause-and-effect. Everything is partly caused by what 
happened before. If the same event happens at two different times, then the very same effect may or 
may not follow. 
 
One day, in this world, John decides to marry his girlfriend Laura. Like everything else, this decision was 
partly caused by what happened before it.” 
 
Probabilistic vignette (low-stake) 
“Please carefully read the text below. You will have to answer questions about it. 
Imagine the following world: In this world, people are not puppets. What they do is caused by what they 
think, feel and decide. 
 
In this world, everything happens as a matter of probabilities. Everything probabilistically results from 
what happened before. If the same event happens at two different times, then each time there is a 
certain probability, between 0 and 100%, that it is followed by a given effect. 
 
One day, in this world, John decides to marry his girlfriend Laura. Like everything else, this decision 
probabilistically resulted from what happened before it.” 




Each participant read a consent form, a set of instructions and was assigned at random to one of two 
experimental conditions (Fig. 3, A). In both conditions, participants were presented with two vignettes. 
In condition 1 (determinism-indeterminism) participants were presented with the deterministic and the 
indeterministic vignette. In condition 2 (indeterminism-probability) participants were presented with 
one deterministic vignette and one probabilistic vignette. The order of vignettes was randomized. 
 After reading the first vignette, participants were asked “In the world you just read about, is it 
possible for a person to have free will?”. Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
“Yes, very certain” to “No, very certain” with the intermediate “Don’t know” (see supplementary notes 
5). After giving their rating, participants were asked to explain their answers. Following this, participants 
were asked two understanding questions, one to check for bypassing one to check for intrusion (see 
supplementary notes 4). Afterward, the procedure was repeated with the second vignette, before 
participants were asked demographic questions and a set of 5 dualism-questions adopted from the free 
will inventory (Nadelhoffer et al. 2014) designed to measure belief in substance dualism (see 
supplementary notes 6). Answers to the dualism-questions were recorded on a 6-point Likert-scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
The bypassing question asked participants to “click the element or elements that have an effect 
on what a person does, in the world you just read about”. Clicking neither ‘decisions’, ‘thoughts’ nor 
Fig 3. A. Experimental design. The procedure of the experiment was as follows: Participants are allocated either to the 
determinism-indeterminism condition or the determinism-probability condition. After that, they are presented with one 
vignette chosen at random and then asked to rate if it is possible to have free will in the described universe. They are then 
asked to explain their rating and asked understanding questions. Afterward, they are presented with the second vignette and 
the procedure is repeated. At the end of the experiment, participants are presented with the dualism questions. B. Bypassing 
responses to deterministic vignette. Show the percentage of responses by respectively dualists and physicalists that commit 
bypassing in response to the deterministic vignette. Error bars reflect confidence intervals. 
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‘feelings’ reveals an epiphenomenalist interpretation and as such cases of bypassing. As part of the 
bypassing question, the option ‘eye color’ was included as a general attention check, as clicking ‘eye-
color’ clearly revealed a lack of attention paid to the vignette. The intrusion question asked “In the 
world you just read about, if we go back in time to just before John made the decision to marry his 
girlfriend, could he have made a different decision?” Answering ‘yes’ in response to the deterministic 
vignette reveal an indeterministic reading of the vignette i.e. the presence of the intrusion effect. 
For statistical analysis, Welch’s t-test was used for comparing free will ratings. Chi-square was 
used for comparing distributions of fully-fledged free will profiles, and logistic regression was used for 
comparing the presence of bypassing and intrusion effects. When the data analyzed was a case of 




65 participants were assigned the determinism-indeterminism condition and 67 participants were 
assigned to the determinism-probability condition. Replies to each of the 5 dualism questions were 
scored from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) to create a compound dualism-score (ranging 
from 0 to 20). The mean dualism-score was 11, the median was 11.5, and the standard error was 0.47. 
This shows generally more dualist beliefs in line with previous research (Nadelhoffer 2014, Wisniewski et 
al. 2019). We also found a significant difference in dualism-scores between scientists and non-scientists 
(Welch t(4.8), p < .001), with scientists being more physicalist than their non-scientist counterparts. To 
check if more physicalist beliefs affect free will concepts we categorized participants who scored 11 or 
below as ‘physicalists’ and those with 12 or higher as ‘dualist’ (50/50 median split, n = 132). 
Data was analyzed to examine three different aspects. First, the data was analyzed without 
controlling for either bypassing or intrusion effects, to examine the relationship between dualism-scores 
and free will ratings (stage 1). Secondly, we analyzed responses to the understanding scores, to check 
for bypassing and intrusion effects, and to analyze the relationship between dualism-scores and these 
understanding errors. Thirdly, using only responses where no bypassing or intrusion effects were 
detected, we again compared dualism scores and free will ratings (stage 2). At no point was any order-
effect detected. 
40% of participants ascribed free will to agents in deterministic worlds (N = 132), 87% ascribed 
free will to agents in indeterministic worlds (n = 65), and 67% ascribed free will to agents in probabilistic 
worlds (n = 67). When comparing free will ratings between physicalists and dualists, physicalists ascribed 
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free will less often to agents in deterministic worlds (Welch t(130) = 2.1, p = .03, Fig. 4, A). No difference 
was found between free will ratings of physicalists and dualists to indeterministic (Welch t(63) = -1.8, p = 
.06) and probabilistic (Welch t(63) = -0.1, p = .09) vignettes (Fig 4, B and C). When mapping out the fully-
fledged free will profiles of participants, 36% were compatibilist, 36% were incompatibilists, 9% were 
hard incompatibilists, 2% were exclusive determinists and for 17% we were unable to assess their 
precise profile because they had given a free will rating of “don’t know” to one or more of the vignettes. 
When comparing the distribution of these free will profiles between physicalists and dualists a 
significant difference was found (x2 p = .02, N = 132), with dualists being more compatibilists and 
physicalists being more incompatibilist.  
When checking for bypassing and intrusion effects, 44% of responses to deterministic vignettes 
passed (n = 58), 84% of responses to indeterministic vignettes passed (n = 55) and 67% of responses to 
probabilistic vignettes passed (n = 45). When comparing differences in bypassing between physicalists 
Fig 4. Free will ratings of dualists and physicalists. A-C shows ratings at stage 1 of analysis without correcting for bypassing and 
intrusion effects, D-F shows ratings at stage 2 of analysis after controlling for bypassing and intrusion effects. A, D. 
Deterministic. B, E. Indeterministic C, F. Probabilistic. Errors bars reflect confidence intervals. 
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and dualists, there was a significant difference of bypassers in responses to the deterministic vignette 
(logistic regression, p = .002, Fig. 3, B). A marginally significant difference of bypassers was found in 
responses to indeterministic (Fisher’s exact test, p = .49) vignettes and no significant difference was 
found in response to probabilistic (logistic regression, p = .78) vignettes. Also when comparing the 
presence of intrusion effects, no significant difference was found (logistic regression, p = .0530). 
 Of the responses with no bypassing or intrusion, 34% ascribed free will to agents in 
deterministic worlds (N = 58), 89% ascribed free will to agents in indeterministic worlds (N = 55), and 
62% ascribed free will to agents in probabilistic worlds (N = 45). When comparing the free will ratings of 
physicalists and dualists to the different worlds, the difference between physicalists’ and dualists’ free 
will rating to deterministic vignettes disappeared (Welch t(55) = -0.6, p. = 55). There was also no 
difference between physicalist and dualist free will ratings to indeterministic (Welch t(39) = 1.6, p = .12) 
and probabilistic vignettes (Welch t(39) = 0.3, p = .79) (Fig. 4, D-F). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Here, we find three primary results of interest. The first is that there is an apparent difference in the free 
will concepts between physicalists and dualists. Specifically, physicalists tend to ascribe free will less 
frequently to agents in deterministic worlds. Belief in physicalism thus appears to drive incompatibilist 
conceptions of free will, while dualist beliefs in contrast seem to drive more compatibilist conceptions of 
free will. One interpretation of this is that people who believe in physicalism are more likely to be 
incompatibilists and hard incompatibilists, in line with our first hypothesis. However, we did not find a 
significant difference in free will ascriptions between physicalists and dualists to neither indeterministic 
nor probabilistic worlds. As such, there is no support for the hypothesis that physicalists tend to be hard 
incompatibilists. It would then appear that physicalist beliefs drive more incompatibilist but not hard 
incompatibilist conceptions and that dualism drives more compatibilist conceptions. However, 
interpreting the data like this does not account for bypassing and intrusion effects. 
The second primary result is that physicalist beliefs and dualist beliefs drive different kinds of 
understanding errors. Though the designed vignettes had a good readability score and should be fairly 
easy to read and understand (Flesch reading ease score = 66.5), less than half the participants 
understood determinism in the intended way. When comparing the number of bypassers between 
physicalists and dualists, we found that physicalists committed more bypassing in response to 
deterministic vignettes, but found no difference in the presence of bypassing in response to either 
indeterministic or probabilistic vignettes. This is in line with the explanation that the difference in free 
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will ascription between physicalists and dualists is driven by physicalists being more likely to interpret 
determinism to entail epiphenomenalism. Different interpretations of determinism based on belief in 
dualism and substance monism has been shown before (Paulhus & Carey 2011, Forstmann & Burgmer 
2018), with monist beliefs driving belief in ‘scientific determinism’ and dualist belief driving belief in 
‘fatalistic determinism’. One particular criticism of the scales used in those studies is that the ‘scientific 
determinism’ subscale inaccurately describes action as caused by genes and upbringing instead of 
capturing the philosophical notion of determinism (Nadelhoffer et al. 2014). Here we expand upon this 
by showing that indeed physicalism, one particular kind of substance monism, drives epiphenomenal 
readings of determinism. This difference in understandings of determinism can explain why physicalists 
less often ascribe free will to agents in deterministic worlds. When comparing the frequency of intrusion 
effects between physicalists and dualists we did not find any significant difference. As such, we did not 
find support for the idea that dualist beliefs make people more likely to commit intrusion. However, the 
p-value reported here was very close to the threshold for significance (logistic regression, p = .0530). It is 
possible that, if an effect exists, it is too small for our sample size here to detect. Nevertheless, we here 
found support for the idea that physicalist beliefs drive epiphenomenal readings of determinism but no 
support for the hypothesis that dualists commit more intrusion than physicalists. 
 Finally, to examine if there was a real difference in free will conceptions, i.e. if any difference 
remained even after controlling for understanding errors, we compared free will ratings of dualists and 
physicalists using only responses where no understanding error was detected. On this analysis, however, 
no significant difference was found between physicalists’ and dualists’ free will ratings in response to 
any of the worlds. We thus failed to find support for the hypothesis that physicalists are genuinely more 
incompatibilist or hard incompatibilist than dualists. Any apparent difference in free will conception 
seems instead to be driven by physicalists being more likely to understand determinism to entail 
epiphenomenalism. When these differences in understanding errors are controlled for, the free will 
concept is stable across beliefs in physicalism and dualism. 
 It has been suggested that the fact that people 1) often reflect incompatibilist free will beliefs 
and 2) that belief in determinism positively predicts belief in free will, 3) reveals an inconsistency in 
people’s beliefs (Wisniewski et al. 2019). This conclusion is pivotal on the idea that people interpret 
determinism in the philosophically relevant way. While we found no difference in intrusion between 
physicalists and dualists, there was a general very high presence of intrusion with more than a third of 
dualists (36%) committing intrusion. In other words, more than a third of substance dualists interpret 
determinism to include indeterministic metaphysics. Belief in this kind of indeterministic ‘determinism’ 
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is not inconsistent with the incompatibilist notion of free will. This throws doubt on whether previous 
findings really show an inconsistency in beliefs and further demonstrates the importance of controlling 
for participants’ interpretation of determinism in this line of research. Whether the intrusion effect can 
fully account for the apparent inconsistency is an open question for future research to settle. 
 Previous research has shown that belief in substance dualism is not only intuitive but also a very 
persistent belief (Bloom 2004, Bering & Bjorklund 2004, Bering 2006, Hood et al. 2012, Hook & Farah 
2013, Forstmann & Burgmer 2015). While differences in beliefs about substance dualism and 
physicalism don’t drive differences in free will conceptions per se, our results might suggest a different 
reason why dualism beliefs are a strong predictor for free will beliefs: Perhaps belief in substance 
dualism simply tracks belief in mental causation, as physicalists are more likely to interpret surrounding 
beliefs (such as determinism) as entailing epiphenomenalism. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Here, we investigated the relationship between belief in physicalism or substance dualism and free will 
concepts. We found that physicalists and dualists have apparent differences in their free will 
conceptions, with dualists being more compatibilist and physicalists being more incompatibilist, but with 
no indication that physicalist beliefs lead to more hard incompatibilist conceptions of free will, contrary 
to Shadlen’s and Roskies’ claim that scientists tend to be both physicalists and hard incompatibilists 
(Shadlen & Roskies 2012). We also found support for the hypothesis that physicalist beliefs lead to more 
bypassing errors when interpreting deterministic descriptions, but found no support for the hypothesis 
that dualist beliefs lead to more intrusion. Furthermore, when the understanding errors of bypassing 
and intrusion were controlled for, there did not appear to be any difference in free will concepts 
between physicalists and dualists, revealing that any such difference was merely apparent and driven by 
differences in understandings of determinism.
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4. Epistemic Virtues and 




In both philosophy and science, there is a common-place assumption that ontological determinism, the 
idea that everything follows with strict necessity from its causes, is real. Here, I argue that our main 
epistemological approaches justify the opposite conclusion. The main argument comes from the 
approach of epistemic virtues. I claim that it is only by accepting ontological indeterminism – the idea 
that determinism is false - that one can satisfy the epistemic virtue of being genuinely self-critical. From 
the position of virtue epistemology, this provides a sufficient reason for accepting indeterminism. I 
further consider two alternative epistemological approaches, direct scientific realism, and epistemic 
pragmatism. I argue that the first should lead us to accept ontological indeterminism as the probabilities 
present in scientific models should be taken as a direct sign of indeterminism. The second approach, by 





“The assumption of an absolute determinism is the essential foundation of every scientific inquiry.”  
– Max Planck (Planck 1958, as translated by Heilbron 1986). 
 
Nature is often thought to follow laws of strict necessity. This means that at every given moment only 
one specific future is compatible with the state of the universe and its laws. In other words, nature is 
thought to be deterministic. Here, I show that despite the common-place belief in determinism we 
actually have better reasons to accept ontological indeterminism; the idea that determinism is false and 
that, at any given moment, several possible futures are compatible with the state of the universe and its 
laws. I take an epistemology first approach, to show that regardless of which epistemology we adopt, 
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we find sufficient reasons to accept ontological indeterminism: The idea that the universe really is 
indeterministic, and does not merely appear to be so. 
The line of reasoning considers three epistemological approaches: Direct scientific realism, 
virtue epistemology, and pragmatism. The main argument is rooted in virtue epistemology. Specifically, I 
claim that with the information available to us today it is impossible to be genuinely self-critical without 
accepting ontological indeterminism. This argument has implications for stochastic22 models in general, 
but for the purpose of this paper, it focuses on models of the brain and mind. There are two reasons for 
this: First, ontologically indeterministic interpretations are still considered problematic in this area (see 
Gessell 2017). Secondly, interpretations of models of the brain and mind have far-reaching implications 
for other areas of philosophy. In particular for philosophy of action where the truth or falsity of 
indeterminism plays a key role in the free will debate and for our understanding of what it means to be 
able to ‘do otherwise’. 
Stochastic models of neural processes, cognition, and behavior are widespread. Explanations of 
these phenomena are written in the language of probabilities. From lower-level mechanisms of single 
neurons and their interactions23, to the higher-level neural computations such as the computation of 
subjective value24, and to the behavioral level of human decision-making25, probabilities are part of the 
explanations: “Neuroscience requires probabilities” (Gessell 2017, p. 1220). But how should we interpret 
these probabilities? Are they a consequence of our inability to represent the world with perfect accuracy 
or is it an ontologically real aspect of the world our models represent? 
Whether the world is fundamentally deterministic or genuinely indeterministic is a central 
question in the philosophy of probabilities. The question concerns how to interpret probabilities. The 
propensity theoretical interpretation of probabilities takes probabilities to reflect physical dispositions or 
tendencies (Pierce 1931, Popper 1959, Hacking 1965, Mellor 1971): Something ‘physically real’ 
“comparable to Newtonian forces” (Popper 1959, p. 27). In this view, chance is a property of the world, 
not merely an epistemically useful construct. In other words, propensity theory is a fundamentally 
indeterministic interpretation of probabilities (Gillies 1973, Kyberg 1974). As Mellor puts it, “if 
propensities are ever displayed, determinism is false” (Mellor 1971, p. 151). On the other hand, the 
subjective interpretation of probabilities considers probabilities as reflecting degrees of belief or 
                                                             
22 By stochastic I mean a random process or event, i.e. a process which evolves according to probabilistic laws. 
(Werndl 2009). 
23 See for instance Dean 1981, Tolhurst et al. 1981, Britten et al. 1996, Rieke et al. 1997, Shadlen & Newsome 1998, 
Auger & Marty 2000, Alvarez et al. 2002, Platkiewicz & Brette 2010, Mohan et al. 2011, Wang et al. 2016. 
24 See Rieke & Baylor 1998, Del Cul et al. 2007, Kurtz-David et al. 2019. 
25 See Neuringer 1986, McFadden 2001, Schurger et al. 2012, Agranov & Ortoleva 2017. 
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credence (Talbott 2016). With the subjective interpretation “Probability is interpreted […] epistemically" 
(Hartmann & Sprenger 2010, p. 2). Or with de Finetti’s words “The fundamental point of the subjectivist 
conception is that the notion of probability does not refer to something which is a property of the 
‘outside world’” (de Finetti 1974, p. 265). Probabilities are then something subjective: They reflect how 
likely a given outcome seems from our limited epistemological position of incomplete information. This 
is a position of epistemic indeterminism but ontological determinism26. 
In the models from cognitive science, quantum probabilities are employed increasingly more 
often and are often understood to imply something like propensities (Pothos et al. 2013). And yet, it 
remains a common-place assumption that all behavior and its underlying phenomena are, despite the 
success of probabilistic explanations, fundamentally deterministic. Renowned neuroscientist Patrick 
Haggard says that “As a Neuroscientist, you’ve got to be a determinist” (Haggard 2010, para. 15), 
perfectly in line with the Planckian maxim quoted at the beginning of this paper. It is a common 
conclusion that our current neuroscientific insights only suffice for a justification of epistemic, but not 
ontological, indeterminism27 (Gessell 2017). Similarly, we often find the assumption of determinism 
amongst philosophers. A plethora of work discusses determinism and free will, but it is rare to find 
reasons for why we should be determinists in the first place (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, List 2014). These 
discussions are instead underlined by an implicit link between determinism and naturalism: An 
association so strong that the terms are sometimes used synonymously (see Dennett 2013, but for an 
exception see McKenna & Pereboom 2016). 
Contrary to this picture and the belief in determinism, I show that we have better reasons to 
accept ontological indeterminism. That is to say, we should interpret the probabilities in our cognitive 
science models as signs of genuine indeterminism. Before proceeding, further two common objections 
should be put aside. These objections inevitably appear whenever arguments for ontological 
indeterminism of the brain and mind are presented. One relates to quantum indeterminism, the other 
to meta-metaphysics. 
                                                             
26 Some Bayesians consider propensity theory a variety of Bayesianism (see Good 1983). However, Bayesianism is 
everywhere called the subjectivist interpretation (Kaye 1988, Hartmann & Sprenger 2010, Talbott 2016) and 
Popper specifically puts forth propensity theory in contrast to the subjectivist interpretations (Popper 1959). 
Conflating propensity theory and Bayesianism is then clearly a misclassification. 
27 Gessell speaks of soft indeterminism and hard indeterminism with the former being the position of epistemic 
indeterminism but ontological determinism that he advocates and the latter being the position of genuine 
ontological indeterminism. I will avoid this terminology of soft and hard indeterminism to avoid confusion with the 
terminology in the free will debate where soft and hard determinism are well-established positions. In the context 
of free will, these prefixes soft and hard denote something quite different from what Gessell has in mind. For the 
sake of clarity, I will therefore continue the use of the terminology epistemic and ontological indeterminism. 
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The first objection appears any time indeterminism of the brain is discussed along with quantum 
mechanics. The objection can be put like this: ‘Whereas quantum-level phenomena may be ontologically 
indeterministic, this does not mean that macro-level phenomena like the ones we are examining in the 
cognitive sciences share this property. The peculiarities of sub-atomic particles have no direct relevance 
for the mechanisms of the brain.’ (see Weber 2005 for an example of this kind of objection). Indeed we 
should be careful not to assume too much similarity between the parts of a thing and the whole of it. 
But the point I make is not an attempt to bridge quantum-level indeterminism to the macro-level 
operations of the cognitive sciences. What I propose is that we have sufficient reasons to accept macro-
level ontological indeterminism, even without such a bridge28. The point I make by turning our attention 
to quantum mechanics is a note against deterministic intuitions and assumptions. As such, it is a 
different point than the kind this objection is (or should be) raised against. 
The second kind of objection that one encounters when arguing in favor of ontological 
indeterminism, is that despite the reasons presented in favor of indeterminism, it remains possible that 
determinism is the case. Certainly, providing strong reasons in favor of one position over another often 
leaves the alternative possible. Yet when it comes to metaphysics, people seem to hold that unless the 
position they find intuitive can be shown to be decidedly impossible, then its mere possibility is 
sufficient reason to accept it. The argument I will present will also not be an argument from necessity. 
And when all is said and done it will remain quite possible that determinism is the case. However, 
anyone who hopes for an argument with the strength to deem either position impossible will surely be 
disappointed by any discussion on the matter whatsoever. All we can hope for is that when we weigh 
the reasons for and against the different possibilities, the weighing should turn out uneven so that one 
position has at least slightly better reasons to be accepted than its alternative. At the end of the present 
discussion, ontological determinism remains a possibility. But if that is all one has left to say in defense 
of the determinist position, then our judgment should be tipped in favor of ontological indeterminism. 
With these clarifications made, the paper proceeds as follows. I will first give reasons for why we 
should not let our intuitions, but epistemological principles, guide our beliefs. Afterwards, I show that 
regardless of which epistemology we choose, direct scientific realism, virtue epistemology, or 
pragmatism, we have better reasons to accept ontological indeterminism. Potential objections will be 
discussed along the way. 
                                                             
28 Nevertheless, it should be noted that wave-particle duality has also been demonstrated at the level of molecules 
(Arndt et al. 1999, Gerlich et al. 2011, Juffman et al. 2012), so it may not be long before one would have to insist 
that molecular interactions are of no relevance for the mechanisms of the brain, to keep the indeterminism out of 
it. 




4.2 Quantum physics and the old-school determinists: A cautionary tale 
In the early days of quantum mechanics, physics was confronted with the question of whether the world 
was ontologically indeterministic or not. Classical mechanics, which had been successful until then, 
corroborated a deterministic picture of the natural world. But the newly discovered quantum 
phenomena did not lend themselves easily to deterministic explanations. Opinions were split on how to 
interpret this probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics. 
Scientists such as Einstein and Schrödinger interpreted quantum phenomena in light of classical 
mechanics. They held that the world was genuinely deterministic and that quantum mechanics with its 
probabilistic explanations was incomplete (Schrödinger 1935, Einstein et al. 1935, Einstein 1936). The 
seemingly indeterminate nature of quantum phenomena was hypothesized as being caused by so-called 
local hidden variables – the idea being that the stochasticity of quantum mechanics was an epistemic 
consequence of our ignorance about the details of these hidden variables: A consequence of our 
epistemic limitations. On this view, the physical laws and quantum phenomena were thought to be 
ontologically deterministic. Our quantum mechanical descriptions would simply be incomplete 
descriptions due to a lack of information about these hidden variables. In opposition to this, other 
thinkers such as Heisenberg, Bohr, and Born accepted the prima facie indeterministic picture. They took 
the probabilistic descriptions of quantum mechanics to be a sign of ontological indeterminism (Born 
1949). And so, the world of physics was divided on how to interpret the probabilities in their models. 
Were they merely a consequence of our epistemic limitations (the byproduct of an incomplete picture), 
or were they a sign of ontological indeterminism (a genuine chance-property in the laws of nature)? The 
question was much debated, with the most famous discussion on the matter perhaps being the Bohr-
Einstein debates ranging from 1927 to 1935 (recounted in Schilpp 1959). 
This difference between these two schools of thought about how to interpret quantum 
mechanics, the difference between deterministic hidden-variables interpretations and the 
indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, is perhaps best illustrated in 
Einstein’s now-famous picture from his letter to Max Born. 
 
“You believe in the God who plays dice, and I in complete law and order in a world which objectively 
exists, and which I, in a wildly speculative way, am trying to capture. I firmly believe, but I hope that 
someone will discover a more realistic way, or rather a more tangible basis than it has been my lot to 
find. Even the great initial success of the quantum theory does not make me believe in the fundamental 
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dice-game […]. No doubt the day will come when we will see whose instinctive attitude was the correct 
one.” – Einstein, letter to Max Born, 1944 (Einstein et al. 1971, p. 149). 
   
Here we then see the difference between determinism and indeterminism illustrated as follows: 
on the one hand, we have determinism as a world of ‘complete law and order’ where everything follows 
with strict necessity from what went before it. And on the other hand, indeterminism is described as an 
ontological ‘dice-game’, a genuine chance-element in the inner workings of the world. Einstein readily 
admits that his belief in determinism rests on an ‘instinctive attitude’; ultimately a matter of intuition. 
Today it seems that many still share this intuition and instinct, on which they base their beliefs about the 
ontological question. 
  Optimistically, Einstein asserted that the day would come when we can see which instinctive 
attitude is the correct one. In 1964, a short nine years after Einstein’s death, the first step towards such 
a sight was made. John Stewart Bell formulated Bell’s theorem (Bell 1964). The theorem reveals 
something rather counterintuitive: The deterministic local-hidden-variables kinds of theories entail 
different empirical outcomes than indeterministic Copenhagen-like alternatives. Eight years after the 
discovery of Bell’s theorem we got a glimpse of which instinctive attitude was the correct one. The first 
Bell-type experiment was conducted (Freedman & Clauser 1972). To Bell’s own surprise the outcome of 
this experiment fell in favor of ontological indeterminism. It provided evidence against local-hidden-
variable interpretations of quantum mechanics. The unexpectedness of this result is well captured by 
Bell’s comments on the outcome: 
 
“For me, it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry with them programs, 
which have been correlated in advance, telling them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that 
when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, 
although history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. [...] So for me, it is a pity that 
Einstein's idea doesn't work. The reasonable thing just doesn't work.” – John Stewart Bell, as quoted by 
Bernstein (Bernstein 1991, p. 84). 
 
Since 1972 many different Bell-type experiments have been carried out, accounting for and 
testing various so-called ‘loopholes’ of the original experiment. To date, every single one of these tests 
has corroborated the original findings. The time may then have come where we can see whose 
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instinctive attitude was the correct one, and that it is Einstein who was wrong29. These days, quantum 
mechanics are often taken to reveal genuine “randomness per se” (Lecoutre et al. 2005, p. 22). If there is 
anything to learn from the peculiarity of the world, it is that we should be careful not to let our 
intuitions carry too much weight with regards to our beliefs. We must be careful not to let our 
instinctive attitudes have too much influence on what we believe about the machinery of the world. 
But even with the evidence for ontological indeterminism on a quantum level, there is no 
guarantee that quantum indeterminism should be amplifiable to the levels of operations of other 
sciences. Perhaps the indeterminism is ‘washed out’ on the macro-level of personhood, mind, and 
action. Perhaps the world is ‘layered’ in different layers of indeterminism and determinism (Bohm 1957, 
Butterfield 2012). Nevertheless, the time is ripe for the cognitive sciences to also have this discussion 
about how to interpret probabilities. As noted, my aim is not to lay the bricks of a bridge stretching from 
the indeterminism of quantum physics to biology. But we now have reason to be skeptical of instinctive 
attitudes and intuitions, which paves the way for arguments based on an epistemic attitude and reasons. 
In the following, we will first consider the epistemology of direct scientific realism. Examining this 
approach and its shortcomings will in a natural way lead us to the second argument. 
 
4.3 The first argument: Direct scientific realism and the naïve empiricist 
The first attitude towards probabilistic models we will consider is direct scientific realism. An example of 
this line of thinking can be found in Fine’s ‘Naturalistic Ontological Attitude’ (Fine 1986). The naturalistic 
ontological attitude states that “Our best guide to ontological questions in any domain is given by our 
best scientific theories of that domain” (List 2014, p. 12). Having a clear picture of this approach will be 
relevant for what comes later. Accepting this attitude without further justification and taking empirical 
models at face-value is what characterizes the position of the naïve empiricist30. 
The reasoning of this approach may proceed in the following way. Our naïve empiricist, let’s call 
him Charlie, runs into the following consideration: Since probabilistic models include an indeterminate 
element and deterministic models do not, it seems that probabilistic models fit better with an 
indeterministic world than with a deterministic one. This is so because in an indeterministic world the 
                                                             
29 It is worth noting, that while the local-hidden-variable variety of deterministic interpretations of quantum 
mechanics have fallen out of favor, other deterministic interpretations have been brought forth: So-called non-
local-hidden-variable theories such as the Broglie-Bohm theory. However, even non-local-hidden-variable theories 
have more recently been problematized by experimental outcomes (Gröblacher et al. 2007, Paterek et al. 2007). 
30 Another example of this kind of argument can be found in Brendon and Carson in the context of evolutionary 
theory (Brandon & Carson 1996). 
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use of probabilities, i.e. the inclusion of an indeterminate element, is a perfect fit - contra the exclusion 
of such an element, as is the case with deterministic models (This should not be confused with the idea 
that the assigned probabilities – the actual quantification – therefore necessarily are a perfect fit). In 
light of this consideration, Charlie concludes that the success of probabilistic models (E1) is more likely 
in a genuinely indeterministic world (H1) than in a deterministic world (H0). He accepts this without 
further justification (exemplifying the naïveté of his position). 
Formally his view on the likelihood of successful probabilistic models can be expressed as 
p(E|H1) > p(E|H0). In light of empirical best-explanation models that are probabilistic, Charlie then 
updates his beliefs in such a way that he concludes ontological indeterminism to be the most likely 
possibility. 
 
Formally this can be expressed as follows: 
1. Probabilistic best-explanation empirical models (E) are more probable given ontological 
indeterminism (H1) than with ontological determinism (H0). 
2. As open- and fair-minded reasoners, we should continuously update our beliefs in light of 
available information. This includes our metaphysical beliefs. 
3. As a consequence of the evidential asymmetry (1), we should then conclude that the world is 
indeterministic (H1) in light of best-explanation probabilistic models (E). 
 
This is the argument from scientific realism, and “the force behind it is a firm realist commitment, 
which underwrites the sharing of properties between the model and its system.” (Gessell 2017, p. 1208). 
In Gessell’s mouth, models are our scientific models and the system is the (part of the) world that the 
models represent. The argument may fall flat to many because of the naïveté of the first premise. In the 
following, we will consider an objection that attacks this premise. Doing so will clarify what we must 
keep in mind to accept the objection and reject the reasoning of the naïve empiricist. This, in turn, will 
be important for the argument to follow. 
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4.4 Objection to the first argument: Empirical evidence can tell us nothing of 
metaphysics 
This objection attacks the first premise of the previous argument. The objection rejects the idea that 
best-explanation probabilistic models are more likely given ontological indeterminism than with 
ontological determinism. 
The critic objects to Charlie’s assumption that probabilistic best-explanation models are more likely 
in an ontologically indeterministic world than in an ontologically deterministic one. Instead, the critic 
claims, best-explanation probabilistic models are exactly what we should expect in an ontologically 
deterministic world when we are in a position of incomplete information. And since we are in a position 
of incomplete information, best-explanation probabilistic models are no more sign of ontological 
indeterminism than determinism. In other words, it is not any more likely that we will have best-
explanation probabilistic models in an ontologically indeterministic world (H1) than in an ontologically 
deterministic one (H0). 
 
Formalized, the objection goes as follows: 
1. From a position of incomplete information, ontological determinism entails best-explanation 
probabilistic models. 
2. We are in a position of incomplete information. 
3. Best-explanation probabilistic models (E), is exactly as likely in a deterministic world as in an 
indeterministic world (E|H0 = E|H1). 
4. Since the evidence E is equally likely in a deterministic world as in an indeterministic world, it 
can tell us nothing about whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic. 
 
This is essentially the objection of empirical underdetermination (Best known as the Duhem-Quine 
thesis (Quine 1951, 1955, Duhem 1954, Suppes 1993, Stanford 2017)). In light of this objection, it seems 
that empirical insights can never inform us about this part of metaphysics. Indeed, the work of Werndl 
has shown that there are cases of empirical equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic 
models (Werndl 2009, 2011). In other words, there are cases where two models, one deterministic and 
the other indeterministic, describe a given system equally well – they make the same predictions and 
are interchangeable. Perhaps our neuroscientific phenomena are such cases, and we just don’t have 
these equally well-working deterministic models yet. 
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    At this junction, one might argue that since empirical insight can tell us nothing about metaphysics, 
we should in fact not conclude anything at all about this matter. That it is a folly to try and answer such 
questions with reason, and that we should abandon the project altogether. Putting aside this 
abandonment of metaphysics for a moment, let us continue taking the metaphysical question seriously. 
If we then accept the objection and abandon the approach of direct scientific realism, which 
epistemological alternatives remain? One alternative is the approach of virtue epistemology. This brings 
us to the second argument in favor of ontological indeterminism: The argument from epistemic attitude. 
 
4.5 The second argument: Self-criticism and the argument from epistemic 
attitude 
When practice can tell us nothing, we must consult the world of principles. The argument from 
epistemic attitude rests on the idea that being self-critical is an epistemic virtue. The argument shows 
that in light of current information, it is only by being indeterminists that we can satisfy the virtue of 
having a genuinely critical attitude towards our convictions. 
In face of empirical underdetermination, Duhem posited that we have an intuitive reasoning 
ability, a ‘good sense’, that allows us to judge among competing theories, despite several theories being 
logically compatible with the available evidence (Duhem 1954). Recently, this part of Duhem’s 
philosophy has been analyzed in terms of responsibilist virtue epistemology31 (Stump 2007, Kidd 2011, 
for a criticism see Ivanova 2010).  Responsibilists think of intellectual virtues as good character traits 
(Code 1987, Zagzebski 1996). The focus here is then the virtues of the epistemic agent (practical virtues), 
and not the virtues theories or particular kinds of explanation (theoretical virtues) 32. The argument from 
epistemic attitude aims to draw a line for when we should change our mind in special cases of empirical 
underdetermination. As such it may be considered an elaboration of at least part of what constitutes 
Duhemian ‘good sense’. 
 
The argument starts with a clarification of what it is to be critical: 
1. To be critical entails being self-critical. 
2. Being self-critical entails taking one’s own fallibility seriously. 
                                                             
31 In contrast to reliabilist virtue epistemology (Sosa 1980, Goldman 1992, Greco 1992, 2003). 
32 For a discussion of the latter see for instance Weiskopf 2017, Keas 2018, and Taylor 2019. 
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3. Taking one’s own fallibility seriously entails believing in a way* so that we could learn (if not in 
practice, then in principle) that we are wrong if we are wrong (the principle of a critical 
attitude). 
4. Believing in a way so we could learn that we are wrong if we are wrong, entails choosing beliefs 
for which we can imagine and think of a way for reality to reveal to us that we are wrong if we 
are wrong. 
*By way of believing I mean the way in which we shape our convictions: How we move from merely 
considering an option to accepting and believing it, and how we move from merely making further 
considerations to updating our beliefs. 
 
From this definition of being self-critical, i.e. as believing in a way so that we could learn that we 
are wrong if we are wrong, it may seem unclear how it differs from open-mindedness. Although 
definitions of open-mindedness vary (Hare 1979, Adler 2004, Riggs 2010), Riggs identifies it as “to be 
aware of one’s fallibility as a believer, and to be willing to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one 
believes something, it is possible to be wrong.” (Riggs 2010, p. 180). Open-mindedness is then simply the 
acknowledgement of one’s fallibility, whereas being self-critical is to take one’s fallibility seriously by 
believing in a specific way: Namely, in accordance with the principle of a critical attitude. To be self-
critical requires that one is open-minded, but it is possible to be open-minded without thereby being 
self-critical. An example of the latter is the stereotypical mentality of conspiracy theorists, who accept 
that their beliefs may be wrong but for whom nothing could ever, even in principle, change their mind. 
Someone who is open-minded could agree with the sentence “It is possible I am wrong, but I can’t think 
of anything that could change my mind about it”, whereas someone who is self-critical could not33. 
As stated, to be self-critical entails believing in a way so that we could learn, at least in principle, 
that we are wrong if we are wrong. I.e. believing in a way so that, in a world where our current belief is 
false, there is a way (at least in principle) for us to learn that we are wrong. The argument from 
epistemic attitude then confronts us with the following question: 
How could we, in principle if not in practice, learn that we are wrong if we are wrong? 
                                                             
33 I take the three primary epistemic virtues to be open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and self-criticism, 
understood in the following ways. To be open-minded is to acknowledge one’s fallibility. To be fair-minded is to 
use the same principles and standards of evaluation for each of a set of competing ideas. To be self-critical is to 
believe in a way so that it is possible, at least in principle, to learn that we are wrong if we are in fact wrong. 
Though there is often overlap between these three virtues, it is possible to be both open-minded and fair-minded 
without necessarily being self-critical. A full elaboration of these three virtues is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however. 




The indeterminist can answer as follows: 
“If we are wrong, then, as we approximate complete information, we will acquire best-explanation 
deterministic models whereby we would learn that we are wrong.”34  
 
The determinists may be tempted to mirror this answer, and reply as well: 
“If we are wrong, then, as we approximate complete information, we would acquire best-explanation 
indeterministic models, whereby we would learn that we are wrong.” 
 
The problem with the determinists’ answer is that what they describe, as the thing that could teach us 
that we are wrong if we are wrong, is exactly what we find today. We are approximating complete 
information: We are continuously learning about the world. And as we continue to learn about the 
world, the best-explanation models we acquire are indeterministic – at least for the time being. 
By mirroring the indeterminist’s answer, the determinists re-introduce the asymmetry in 
evidential support that is the first premise of our naïve empiricist. They re-introduce the idea that best-
explanation indeterministic models serve as evidential support against ontological determinism. This is 
the asymmetry that was rejected earlier. And so, the first argument resumes its validity, but this time on 
critical grounds. 
 
Formally the argument from epistemic attitude goes as follows: 
1. As fallible creatures, we should apply a critical epistemological attitude when shaping our 
beliefs. 
2. Having a critical epistemological attitude entails believing in a way so that we could learn (if not 
in practice, then in principle) that we are wrong if we are wrong. 
                                                             
34 It is important to note that the answer does not depend on the possibility of actually acquiring complete 
information. How close to complete information must we be to find best-explanation deterministic models in a 
deterministic world? If we have complete information (100%), then we will surely have such models in a 
deterministic world. But perhaps deterministic models overwhelmingly become best explanation models much 
sooner than that. Perhaps deterministic models will out-compete indeterministic models when we have acquired 
70% of all information, or2.5%, or 0.000001%. It is impossible to tell. The important point is that such a breaking 
point where deterministic models become best-explanation models (or at least equally-well-explaining models) 
must necessarily exist in a deterministic world. And this breaking point could lie long before we reach complete 
information. As such, the impossibility of actually acquiring complete information does not invalidate the 
indeterminist’s answer. 
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3. In light of current best-explanation probabilistic models, only indeterminists can learn (in 
principle) that they are wrong if they are wrong. 
4. In light of current best-explanation probabilistic models, we should be indeterminists. 
 
The question from a critical epistemic attitude remains as a standing challenge to determinists: To 
answer the following without either being uncritical and dogmatic, and without introducing the kind of 
evidential asymmetry that justifies indeterminism on empirical grounds. 
 
If we accept determinism, how could we, in principle if not in practice, learn that we are wrong if we are 
wrong? 
 
Without a determinist answer to this question, the reasonable conclusion is that only by being 
indeterminists could we ever learn (in principle if not in practice) that we are wrong if we are wrong. 
And so it is only by accepting indeterminism, in light of our current best-explanation models of the 
world, that we apply a genuinely critical epistemic attitude. Determinism on the contrary becomes a 
position of dogma. 
The argument from epistemic attitude is particularly relevant for those who find that 
instrumental noise could justify a belief in determinism. For if we take the stochasticity of our models to 
be signs of instrumental noise, we put ourselves in the kind of position where we could never learn that 
we are wrong if we are wrong. In an ontologically indeterminist world, we would forever misinterpret 
the real indeterminism as instrumental shortcomings. To be genuinely self-critical, we must find another 
justification for a belief in determinism, than the fact that the stochasticity of our models could be the 
result of instrumental noise. 
The metaphysician may again object, however, that there is no way we could learn even in 
principle that we are wrong if we are wrong. The proper conclusion, following from the second premise 
of the argument, is then that we shouldn’t believe either position: That we can draw no conclusion at 
all. This would lead us to a point of epistemic fatalism, which in a world of action transforms into 
epistemic pragmatism. 
But before considering the pragmatic turn, we should dispatch a potential misunderstanding. 
One might read the argument from epistemic attitude to entail that from any position of incomplete 
information we should be indeterminists. It would then be a sort of argument from ignorance, which 
argues that when we do not have complete information, indeterminism is the way to go. This would 
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trivialize the discussion since we can never actually occupy a position of complete information. Being an 
indeterminist would therefore always be more reasonable. This reading is a misunderstanding and does 
not follow from the argument presented. To see why, we should consider when the argument from 
epistemic attitude pushes us to be determinists from a position of incomplete information. With this 
aim, we will once again turn to our old-school determinists of the last century. 
 
4.6 When being a determinist is reasonable: The old-school determinists again 
Bell was right to proclaim Einstein’s position reasonable, even though history has justified the critics. 
When quantum mechanics was first encountered at the turn of the last century, it was at a point in time 
where deterministic explanations reigned supreme. With the great explanatory success of classical 
mechanics, the more we learned about the world the more of it seemed explainable in deterministic 
terms. For centuries it had been the case that the more we learned about the world, the more 
deterministic it appeared. Although many complex phenomena were not yet subject to satisfying 
deterministic explanations, the components, whose combined interactions constituted these complex 
phenomena, seemed individually to be perfectly deterministic. In light of this, it was reasonable to 
assume that the more complex phenomena were fundamentally deterministic and that they would 
ultimately succumb to deterministic descriptions. It was reasonable to suspect that our failure to 
develop accurate deterministic descriptions of the complex phenomena was a consequence of our 
inability to accurately account for the chaotic interaction of the (deterministic) components: A 
consequence of our limited epistemic capacity. At that point in time, determinists were the ones who 
could satisfy the principle of a critical epistemic attitude. 
Recall again the argument from epistemic attitude as it was put earlier: 
 
1. As fallible creatures, we should apply a critical epistemological attitude when shaping and 
choosing our beliefs. 
2. Having a critical epistemological attitude entails believing in a way so that we could learn (if not 
in practice, then in principle) that we are wrong if we are wrong. 
3. In light of current best-explanation probabilistic models, only indeterminists can learn (in 
principle) that they are wrong if they are wrong. 
4. In light of current best-explanation probabilistic models, we should be indeterminists. 
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This is how the argument goes today. But at the time of our old-school determinist, the current best-
explanation models were deterministic, not indeterministic. At least up until the discovery of quantum 
mechanics. So, at the time of our old-school determinists, the third step looked different. Instead, it 
would have been:  
 
3. In light of current best-explanation deterministic models, only determinists can learn (if not in 
practice then in principle) that they are wrong if they are wrong. 
 
At the beginning of the last century, determinists could learn that they were wrong if they were wrong: 
Their future might produce best-explanations indeterministic models to replace the deterministic 
models. When the old-school determinists discussed why the indeterministic picture of quantum 
mechanics might be an incomplete or even paradoxical picture, as with the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen 
hypothesis (Einstein et al. 1935), they were discussing and (implicitly) working towards an answer to the 
question of how they could learn that they were wrong if they were wrong. These critical discussions 
constituted a process that culminated in Bell’s theorem and Bell-type experiments – and with those, an 
outcome that did show exactly what could be expected if our old-school determinists were in fact 
wrong. As such, our old-school determinists acted in accordance with the argument from epistemic 
attitude, as only the determinists at the time could learn (in principle) that they were wrong if they were 
wrong. 
Consider again Einstein’s comment to Born when he says that “No doubt the day will come 
when we will see whose instinctive attitude was the correct one” (Einstein et al. 1971, p. 149). ‘No 
doubt’ we will be able to see whose instinct was correct. This is the sound of someone who believes in a 
way so that they can in principle learn that they are wrong, if they are wrong. Because of the practical 
limitations of the time, the day was not yet ripe. It was still not possible in practice, but there was room 
for such a sight in principle. 
Bell was right to call our old-school determinists reasonable, and his surprise at the outcome of 
Bell-type experiments is appropriate. But today, as we learn more about the world and as 
indeterministic models continue to be corroborated by experiments and outmatch deterministic 
models, even at the level of the components that compose the more complex higher-level phenomena, 
it is no longer the determinists that can satisfy the principles of a critical epistemological attitude. Only 
indeterminists can do so. 
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From what has been said so far, we seem to be in a position where we are hard-pressed to 
accept indeterminism either on epistemic principles with the argument from epistemic attitude or on 
empirical grounds with direct scientific realism. In either case, the pendulum swings towards 
indeterminism. But a third option remains. Perhaps the entire discussion seems unsatisfying for the 
reason that neither empirical insights nor principles of epistemic virtues should have any bearing on our 
conviction. This is a fair objection, which brings us to a third epistemological approach. It is this third 
approach that will constitute the final considerations of this paper. 
 
4.7 Leaving metaphysics behind: Pragmatism proper and the pointless 
pragmatic 
A common counterargument against any position on the matter at hand is that the question lies outside 
the scope of what we can justifiably say anything about. The truth of the matter is beyond the reach of 
human reason. The idea here is that the limits of reason, which make such questions unanswerable, 
make it reasonable to abandon the question altogether: The only reasonable position is one of pure and 
total agnosticism. 
However, where the aim of our convictions cannot be truth, the hallmark for justification is 
explanatory use35. Although the truth of this metaphysical matter may be permanently out of reach, we 
must still interact with and understand the world. Even if our interaction with it is doomed to be rooted 
in some flawed, incomplete, understanding of it. This is the position of epistemic pragmatism, where the 
difference between epistemic and ontological indeterminism dissolves in a sea of irrelevance, and 
whose motto is ““We have to live today by what truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call 
it falsehood” (James 1907, p. 150). For an epistemic pragmatist, what things look like at the edge of our 
epistemic horizon is how one takes them to be.  
Yet here another objection may be raised. A particular species of pragmatist objects, that to be a 
pragmatist is to only ever be epistemically committed. As if pragmatists would never dare to speak of 
truth and have beliefs about the world as is. There is a subtle kind of hypocrisy at play in this branch of 
‘pragmatism’. This kind of pragmatist is certainly no determinist. He walks like an indeterminist, talks 
like an indeterminist, and interacts with the world like an indeterminist. But he is not an indeterminist. 
Or so he says. That is a step too far he claims. The position is a kind of epistemic limbo, where one dares 
                                                             
35 Exactly what counts as ‘use’ as well as how general or individualized this notion should be understood is a topic 
for discussion beyond the scope of this paper. 
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not accept anything as real but think of everything as a fiction: A position Quine calls “a perverse one”36 
(Quine 1955, p. 241). This is the position of the pointless pragmatic: In practice to act in accordance with 
one belief about the world and yet refrain from believing this about the world. For if everything is 
exactly as if indeterminism is real, then what is the point of being a fence-sitting sceptic? I can think of 
only one reason: To preserve epistemic caution. But preserving caution does not require that we 
exclude having beliefs about the world. Caution is preserved when our beliefs are accompanied by the 
appropriate amount of uncertainty and a continued willingness to update our beliefs. In other words, so 
long that what we accept as true today is something we are ready to call false tomorrow. 
It is difficult to imagine a greater handicap for any epistemology to suffer, than the inability to 
justify beliefs about the world in general. This is the perversion of epistemology that Quine warns about. 
Never ascribing full reality to things simply because there is some uncertainty in play: To have epistemic 
principles for justifications of beliefs without allowing these beliefs to be about the world and what is 
real. It is a disservice to the pragmatist tradition to impose this handicap upon it. Indeed, pragmatism 
proper does not imprison one’s judgment in this epistemic limbo. It has clear principles for justification 
of beliefs, with which our beliefs can extend to be about the world and its ontology. If one accepts the 
pragmatist principles for justification and is asked if he believes the world is indeterministic, the current 
answer should be yes. The metaphysician may want to probe further and ask if the pragmatist believes if 
the world is merely epistemically indeterminate or ontologically indeterministic, but no pragmatist 
should answer yes to the first and no to the second, lest he be an epistemic pervert. As far as the 
pragmatist is concerned, the justification for one is the same as the other. He has already given his 
answer and the metaphysician is welcome to extrapolate that answer onto any impractical metaphysical 
subtleties he would like. 
 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
The arguments presented here constitute h a three-pronged line of reasoning for accepting ontological 
indeterminism. We are pressed to accept ontological indeterminism either on empirical grounds, on 
virtuous grounds, or from a position of epistemic pragmatism. I have argued that we should guard 
ourselves against the missteps of instinctive attitudes, and if we do so, find sufficient reasons for 
                                                             
36 Quines himself writes that he ”subscribe to determinism as fully as the quantum physicists will let me” (Quine 
1981, p. 11). Expressing both the common default assumption of determinism, but also a willingness to let the 
scientific models have the last say, and update his belief in light of these models. Today, he would surely also let 
the neuroscientific models limit his assumption of determinism. 
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accepting ontological indeterminism. When we learn about the world we should apply a critical, but not 
dismissive, judgment – and be careful not to explain away what we can see by assuming that it can’t be. 
The advantage of the argument from epistemic attitude is that it provides us with a principle 
intrinsically tied to the universal virtue of self-criticism. And with this principle, we then have reasonable 
grounds for drawing conclusions in at least some cases of empirical underdetermination. Due to the 
holistic nature of beliefs, any time new information or new considerations problematize a given idea we 
hold as true, one of two options remain open to us: We can either change our mind about the belief in 
question, or we can change our mind about one or more of the surrounding assumptions. The big 
problem of empirical underdetermination is that there is no clear line for when we should adjust the 
auxiliary assumptions and when we should instead change our core beliefs. The principle of a critical 
attitude provides us with such a point of demarcation. It draws the line between when the continued 
adjustments of auxiliary assumptions remain justified (all other things equal), and when we should 
instead change our mind about the core belief in question. As it is derived directly from a clarification of 
what it is to be self-critical, the argument from epistemic attitude serves as a critical tool for choosing 
beliefs in the face of empirical underdetermination. 
To answer the question in the title: We should be indeterminists when only the indeterminist 
position can satisfy the principle of a critical attitude. Similarly, the principle of a critical attitude also 
marks a clear point for when we should become determinists. If I am asked what I feel like the world is: 
Deterministic. If I am asked what I think the world is: Indeterministic. When I advocate indeterminism in 
the strong sense, it is not an attempt to justify my own intuitions. It is because my attempts to justify 
these intuitions have failed. I can find no critical justification for a belief in determinism. And know of no 
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Libertarian accounts of free will require that indeterminism is true – i.e. that at any instant more than 
one future is compatible with the laws of nature and the state of the universe at that instant. One of the 
primary challenges for such indeterministic accounts of free will is ‘the problem of luck’. The problem 
arises from the idea that, if decisions are indeterminate, this entails an element of freedom-
undermining luck in human agency. Here, I develop an account of free will where indeterministic agents 
can adjust their internal indeterminacy via recursive decisions: Decisions that reorder their motivational 
hierarchy. This kind of decision-making provides the agent with an aspect of control over their internal 
indeterminacy, which alleviates the problem of luck. Despite this, it is argued that the problem of luck 
ultimately remains unsolvable. If indeterminism is real we must accept innate randomness and luck as 
part of human agency. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
“Diana, a libertarian goddess in an indeterministic universe, wants to build rational, free human beings 
[…]. Now, because Diana is a relatively typical libertarian, she believes that free decisions cannot be 
deterministically caused - even by something that centrally involves a considered judgment that it would 
be best to A straightaway […]. So Diana designs her agents in such a way that, even though they have 
just made such a judgment, and even though the judgment persists in the absence of biological damage, 
they may decide contrary to it. 
Given Diana’s brand of libertarianism, she believes that whenever agents freely perform an action of 
deciding to A, they could have freely performed some alternative action. She worries that her design 
does not accommodate this. Her worry, more specifically, is that if the difference between the actual 
world, in which one of her agents judges it best to A straightaway and then, at t, decides accordingly, 
and any possible world with the same past up to t and the same laws of nature in which he makes an 
alternative decision while the judgment persists is just a matter of luck, then he does not freely make 
that decision in that possible world W.” (Mele 2006, p. 7-8) 




This myth imagined by Mele illustrates one of the fundamental metaphysical challenges to libertarian 
notions of free will: The problem of luck37. The objection attacks libertarian free will – the notion that 
free will requires ontological indeterminism38 - by claiming that indeterminism introduces a freedom-
undermining element of luck (randomness) in the agent’s decision-making and subsequent actions. The 
idea is that the randomness entailed by indeterminism undermines agentive control which is necessary 
for free will. As such, indeterminism threatens freedom of will. The problem comes in two versions – a 
soft version and a hard version. The soft version relates to indeterminism in the execution of action and 
the hard version relates to indeterminism in the process of deciding. 
In this paper I will argue for two core claims: 1) The hard version of the problem of luck – the 
one illustrated by Mele’s myth – is unsolvable. If indeterminism is true, we must accept that some 
internal randomness and luck is part of human agency. 2) Nevertheless, free agents have an important 
kind of control of their internal randomness, which alleviates the hard problem of luck. By directing 
decisions at their own motivational structure and future decisions they can influence the internal 
probabilities39 of the agent. The capacity for this kind of decision-making constitutes an important kind 
of control and freedom in an indeterministic framework. 
 
The primary aspects of the recursive account of freedom include that: 
1. Freedom of the will is a structural matter – it depends on the structure and the causal 
potential of the agent, not the occurrence of any particular event. 
2. The functional capacity that constitutes freedom of the will is the capacity for recursive 
decision-making – decisions directed at the agent’s own motivational structure whereby 
the agent can effectively reorder their motivational hierarchy. 
3. The capacity for recursive decision-making requires higher-order awareness of the 
agent’s own motivational structure. Therefore, the agent’s higher-order awareness of 
itself as a motivated and agentive creature is a necessary requirement for free will. 
                                                             
37 Sometimes called the mind problem (Van Inwagen 2017). 
38 By indeterminism, I mean the idea that at any instant more than one future is compatible with the state of the 
universe at that instant and the laws of nature. Determinism is the negation of indeterminism, i.e. at any instant 
exactly one future is compatible with the state of the universe at that instant and the laws of nature (Mele 2006). 
39
 Here and in general when speaking of ’probabilities’ in this paper I am referring to the objective probabilities 
that are a product of the world’s ontological indeterministic randomness. When considering probabilities from an 
epistemic perspective, however, I am open to the idea of ’imprecise probabilities’ (Seamus 2019). 
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4. Freedom of the will does not depend upon how extreme or even the probabilities of 
competing first-order desires are – instead it depends upon the possible effect of 
recursive decisions on these probabilities: The potential strength of recursive decisions. 
5. A free action does not require that a recursive decision about the effective motive has 
taken place prior to the action (see 1). 
6. Freedom of the will is a graded phenomenon that can be meaningfully quantified as the 
product of the scope and strength of potential recursive decisions. 
 
5.2 Indeterminism and luck 
One of the primary objections against the idea of free will in indeterministic worlds is the problem of 
luck.  
 
Formalized, the problem goes as follows: 
 If an agent’s acts are undetermined, then how they act on a given occasion is a matter of chance 
 If how an agent act is a matter of chance then the agent does not have free will 
 Ergo: if an agent’s acts are undetermined, the agent does not have free will (van Inwagen 2017, 
see also Mele 2006) 
 
There are two places where such indeterministic chance becomes problematic for freedom. The first is 
at the stage between decision and action – randomness in the execution of action. The second is at the 
stage between motivational structure and decision – randomness in the choice of action. 
Randomness in the execution of action is what I call the ‘soft’ version of the problem of luck. 
Consider the example of a sniper who attempts to shoot his target but misses because some 
indeterministic events in his motor system lead to a twitch in his arm or a misevaluation of the 
trajectory of the bullet (Kane 1999, 2007). In such a case, luck clearly serves as an obstacle for the 
successful execution of an action, by preventing the agent from doing as they intend to. Although the 
role of indeterministic luck in the executive processes is an important problem for the analysis of free 
action, it is relatively unproblematic for questions of freedom of the will40  (except on those accounts 
that hold that freedom in action and freedom of the will is identical41). Reducing randomness in the 
execution of action corresponds well with our everyday notion of skill: Someone who is skillful at a given 
                                                             
40 See for instance Foot 1966 and Austin 1979. 
41 See Hobbes 1651. 
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action will have a high probability of executing it successfully. But lacking the skills to successfully 
execute certain actions is not the same as lacking free will. An unskilled agent may freely attempt to do 
what he lacks the skills to do successfully, but whether or not indeterministic events in his execution 
results in a successful or unsuccessful attempt, indeterministic interference at this point tells us nothing 
about whether the agent’s will is free or not42. Similarly, a very skillful agent may occasionally fail under 
the best of circumstances due to innate randomness in the executive processes, but this also does not 
problematize our potential for free will. Even adults may stumble despite being skillful walkers. But the 
occasional stumble does not exclude that the person has free will. The successful execution of free 
actions may in part depend upon the internal randomness leading to one outcome instead of another, 
but this does not problematize free will. 
Randomness in the choice of action, however, is where the problem of luck strikes at the heart 
of ontological indeterminism. This is the hard version of the problem which is illustrated by Mele’s myth. 
Consider again our would-be assassin, but at a point in time before he has settled on the decision to kill 
his target. He has excellent reasons not to kill the target and has in fact recently come to the conclusion 
that it is best not to murder people at all. Nevertheless, because of some indeterministic events in his 
decision-making process, he decides (i.e. forms the intention) to assassinate his target. When he 
assassinates his target (or attempts to) he does it intentionally – but whether his will is free is precisely 
what the problem of luck brings into question. Even intentional actions may be unfree. This version of 
the problem, I contest, has no solution. It teaches us something about human agency that the world of 
philosophy has been reluctant to accept: That human agency and free will entails an aspect of 
unavoidable, innate, randomness. In an indeterministic world, the relationship between the 
motivational hierarchy of an agent and which motive actually becomes effective is a matter of chance: 
At any given moment, either of two (or more) competing motives have a certain probability of becoming 
effective (i.e. of moving the agent to action). If this was all there was to it, and these internal 
probabilities concerning which motive becomes effective was entirely out of the agent’s hands, the 
notion of free will would indeed be in dire shape43. What a person needs is some aspect of control over 
these internal probabilities: A way to influence and shape them. 
                                                             
42 Though it may problematize whether he intentionally did what he tried to do, in precisely the way that luck 
serves as a case of causal deviance. See for instance Mele & Moser 1994. 
43
 An example of this can be found in Robert Kane’s account of self-forming actions, where the indeterministic 
competition between motives constitutes the agent’s ’efforts’ and so whichever choice she makes she is 
considered free (Kane 1999). See also Chisholm 1966. 
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Before we get going we should note a common approach to the problem that will not be taken 
up here, which is the appeal to agent-causation (Clarke 2000, O’Connor 2000). I do not think such 
accounts provide a proper solution to the problem of luck for even if we grant that decisions are 
produced by agent-substance or emergent ‘active power’ this does nothing to undo the randomness of 
indeterministic relations or explain how these indeterministic relations come under the control of the 
agent44. Here, it is worth repeating Van Inwagen’s recommendation to agent-causalists, when he says: 
“do not underestimate the power of the mind argument”45 (Van Inwagen 2017, p. 165). The logic of 
agent-causation simply does not strike at the logic of the problem of luck (for a thorough analysis of this 
see Mele 2006, but for a reply see O’Connor 2007). 
 
5.3 Recursive decisions: A tool against luck 
Consider one of Diana’s indeterministic agents, Sven. Sven’s motivational structure consists of several 
different motives, many of them in conflict with each other. For instance, Sven has both the desire46 to 
eat meat and the desire not to harm animals or contribute to their suffering. Sven has also judged it 
better to forgo his desire to eat meat in order not to contribute to the suffering of animals. One day, as 
Sven is walking through town, he gets hungry. Due to the indeterministic nature of his decision-making 
process, his desire to eat meat becomes effective and he forms the proximal intention47 to eat meat. I.e. 
he decides against his better judgment to have a shawarma from the nearby shawarma place48. Two 
conflicting desires are occurrent, the desire to eat meat and the desire not to contribute to the suffering 
of animals. Both feed into the selection-process for action (the selection-process for which occurrent 
desire becomes effective), and each option has some probability between 0 and 1 of being selected 
(probabilities of precisely 0 and 1 are excluded, as this would constitute a case of determinism, and 
Diana’s agents are fully indeterministic). Due to the indeterministic nature of this selection-process, the 
action motivated by the desire to eat meat is selected and thereby decided upon. When Sven is eating 
                                                             
44 Although the O’Connor variety of agent-causation deserves special praise for his emergent picture of agency 
which avoids appealing to agent-substance (O’Connor 2000), his notion of emergent ’active power’ does little to 
alleviate the problem of luck (See Mele 2006). 
45 Note that the mind-argument is what Van Inwagen calls the problem of luck. 
46 For the purpose of this paper, ‘desire’ is meant in the broad understanding of the term as it is commonly used in 
the literature, i.e. as pro-attitudes with a motivational component. (Davidson 1963, Frankfurt 1971). 
47 Intentions to act here-and-now, in contrast to distal intentions which are intentions to act at a later time (Mele 
1992a). 
48 Scenarios as these – cases of weakness of will - are instantiations of luck-cases in worlds like Diana’s. When all 
actions are luck-cases, all cases of weakness of will are cases of luck but not all cases of luck are cases of weakness 
of will. Whether the agent forms an intention in line with one’s better judgment (rational) or an intention that 
conflicts with one’s better judgment (irrational) is a matter of chance in Diana’s world. 
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his shawarma, he is doing it intentionally and, supposedly, he thinks his decision was made freely. But 
Diana despairs, for she thinks that Sven’s sense of freedom is illusionary, as a case of freedom-
undermining luck has just occurred. I agree with Diana, for Sven remains ultimately a slave of desires 
which he has had no influence over. These desires and their corresponding weights are randomly 
distributed amongst him at the whims of nature, environment, or - in this case - Diana. Though they may 
be dynamic a changeable, for instance through repetition and the acquisition of new habits, Sven’s 
desires and their weights are not of his own making. 
What Sven lacks is the potential to shape his own motivational hierarchy; he lacks a mechanism 
for influencing his own internal probabilities. Suppose that Sven had the capacity to make decisions that 
target and alter his own motivational structure: The capacity for recursive decisions. With recursive 
decisions, an agent can then reorder his motivational hierarchy. When such a reordering is causally 
effective this amounts to directly influencing the probabilities for which motives become effective, 
although remains possible that the objective (ontological) probabilities do not perfectly mirror the 
intended reordering even after an effective recursive decision has taken place. It is if a person has such a 
mechanism to willfully and directly change their own internal probabilities, i.e. if the agent has the 
capacity for recursive decision-making, that a person has free will. Here it should be stressed that free 
will does not depend upon the probability distribution of first-order desires, regardless of how extreme 
or even they are. Free will depends instead on the potential for recursive decisions to affect these 
probability distributions of first-order desires. 
Now, it is merely in having this capacity and not in the use of it that a person’s will is free. So 
long as the capacity is there, the agent has the potential to shape his own motivational hierarchy. It is 
logically possible, however unlikely, that there should exist an agent with the capacity for recursive 
decision-making without ever making use of it. For example, a person might upon reflection find that 
the hierarchy of their desires is exactly as they want it to be, and so they choose not to change anything 
about it. Such a person has free will even if they never make a recursive decision in their life. This does 
not amount to saying that none of his actions are free if no recursive decision takes place. On the 
contrary, all or almost all of the agent’s actions will be quite free even if no recursive decision occurs. 
Freedom of the will is ultimately a structural matter: It concerns the agent’s causal potential. 
Specifically, the causal potential of recursive decisions, i.e. the extent to which such recursive decisions 
can change the objective probabilities that constitute the motivational structure of the agent. A person 
may neglect the use of their freedoms, but this is not the same as being without them. 
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If Sven has recursively reordered his motivational structure, it is no longer the case that he is at 
the whims of desires whose weights are not of his own making. They are - at least in part. In a certain 
sense, he has created his own luck, regardless of which decision he ends up making. He is to a certain 
degree – but to a degree only – the craftsman of his own inner roulette wheel. By influencing his 
internal probabilities via recursive decision-making, Sven himself becomes an important part of the 
multifaceted causes of his motivational structure49. Reordering one’s own hierarchy clearly requires that 
the agent perceives themselves as an agent with such a motivational hierarchy and the awareness both 
that these motives can be conflicting and that they can change. Recursive decisions thus depend upon 
this kind of higher-order awareness50. It is only with this awareness and the effective reordering of their 
own motivational structure that an agent can make decisions about what kind of agent he becomes. 
Here, we also see why the mere potential for changing inner probabilities via repetition and the 
acquisition of new habits is itself insufficient for free will. Since creatures with this kind of higher-order 
awareness clearly can make recursive decisions (at least phenomenologically), this class of decisions 
would be epiphenomenal if any actual change in objective probabilities was entirely dependent on some 
further repetitions beyond the decision itself. 
Such recursive decisions can be said to be done for a reason in the Melean sense, where this 
does not necessarily require any belief-component or reflective deliberation, and where actions done 
for bad reasons (even from the agent’s point of view) as well as intrinsically motivated actions that are 
done for no further reason counts as ’being done for a reason’ (Mele 1992b). A recursive decision can 
thus take place as a result of the agent being confronted with new reasons, gaining new desires51, or 
forming new beliefs – perhaps as a result of self-evaluation. Sven might, for instance, upon learning 
about the cruelties imposed on animals in the food sector form the second-order desire not to be 
moved by his taste for meat, which triggers a decision to reorder his motivational hierarchy and thereby 
reduce the probability that his desire to eat meat will become effective in the future. 
There are at least two ways in which a recursive decision might modify the probability for which 
desire becomes effective. The first is by a reduction of the intensity of desire and the second is by an 
                                                             
49 The capacity for recursive decision-making can also be mapped onto a compatibilist framework. Here, however, 
the focus is to consider this account within an incompatibilist framework and explore how it relates to the problem 
of luck. 
50 Though this does not require that the agent has an accurate awareness of their motivational structure, only that 
they perceive themselves as the kind of thing that has motives and a motivational structure. 
51
 This is not to say that recursive decisions themselves create new desires. Though the creation and destruction of 
new desires is an interesting part of the human condition, how this comes about is not something to be explored in 
detail here, as it is inconsequential for our current analysis.  
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increase in the amount of willpower. First of all, recursively reordering the motivational hierarchy might 
simply affect the desires themselves. If the agent, for instance, makes a decision that recursively reduces 
the probability that a certain desire becomes effective (such as pre-emptively deciding against acting 
upon it when the opportunity presents itself), this might simply result in that desire being felt 
comparatively less intensely at the moment of action. Neurally, this could be realized by 
neuromodulatory effects on the representations of the desire, such that the representation activates 
less easily from upstream-stream influences (i.e. relevant stimulus) and such that, when it activates, it 
results in smaller down-stream effects (i.e. on the selection-process for action whose inputs are the 
competing desires and where either the threshold for acting is met or not)52. Essentially reducing the 
desire, which is to say, reducing how much desire the agent feels for a given ‘option’ when confronted 
with the opportunity to choose it. The second way a recursive decision might influence the internal 
probabilities is by modifying how much ‘synchronous self-control’, i.e. ‘willpower’ (Kennett & Smith 
1996, Mele 1997, Holton 1999, Sripada 2014), the agent is likely to exert when the desire is activated. 
For instance, by a re-sculpting of the connections between neural representations of desires and the 
circuitry relevant for synchronous self-control (for instance particular pre-frontal regions (Heatherton &  
Wagner 2011)), such that the latter is more sensitive to the activation of the former – thus increasing 
the chance that effortful synchronous self-control will be attempted and increase the degree of such 
efforts. Such dynamic re-sculpting of the relevant neural circuits would be cases of ‘criterial causation’ 
and could occur via dynamic synaptic resetting as outlined by Peter Tse (Tse 2011). Although this kind of 
decisive and agentive reordering of the motivational hierarchy would be a contrast to the kind of 
motivational restructuring that takes place entirely through repetition, such habitual learning through 
repetition may very well accompany and either supplement or work against the effects of a recursive 
decision. 
Nevertheless, if a person has recursively reordered the hierarchy of his motives so that one 
motive outweighs the other and thereby has a higher probability of becoming effective, it must remain 
possible that the lower-ranking motive will become effective simply due to internal randomness in the 
decision-making process. This must be the case to keep in line with Diana’s libertarian requirement that 
free decisions cannot be deterministically caused. However, there is no theoretical limit for how small 
such a probability can be (only that cannot be infinitely small or 0). For instance, it is possible that Sven 
                                                             
52 Neuromodulatory effects of agency have for instance been demonstrated on visual and attentional processes 
(Loyola-Navarro et al. 2020). Interestingly, the authors suggest modulatory effects on dopamine, acetylcholine, 
and noradrenergic circuits – circuits which have also been shown to be of key importance for the representation of 
desires (or of ’wanting’) (Daw & Shohamy 2008, Kim 2013). 
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recursively modifies his motivational structure such that the probability that his desire to eat meat is so 
astronomically small that even if Sven has to decide between meat and vegetables several times a day 
for his entire life, there is less than a 0.1% chance that the desire to eat meat will become effective even 
once. It is possible, that the probability that certain desires become effective is so small that it becomes 
what ordinary non-metaphysicians would call practically determined53. But recursive decisions cannot 
make a fundamentally indeterministic universe deterministic. Even with recursive decision-making, we 
are then, to a certain degree, always at the mercy of chance. But this degree is within the agent’s grasp 
to change.  And recursive decisions are the agent’s tool for influencing these inner probabilities: A tool 
against the randomness within us. 
 
5.4 Luck again: Biting bullets and further consequences 
Would the above account of recursive decision-making satisfy Diana’s worries? I suspect not. Perhaps 
neither Diana nor Mele will be satisfied that recursive decision-making solves the hard problem of luck. 
Even if they agree that that recursive decision-making does grant the agent an important kind of control 
and influence over their own internal randomness, they might still object to it as a genuine solution for 
the reason that randomness and luck is still part of the picture in at least two ways. First of all, even if 
the motivational hierarchy of the agent has been recursively modified, it is still a matter of chance 
whether the agent acts one way or another at the moment of action. After all, recursive decisions only 
influence the probabilities that certain desires will become effective. Even if Diana imbues her agents 
with the capacity for recursive decision-making, she is left with an agent who might act contrary to his 
best judgment at time t even with the same past up to t and the same laws of nature. And so, Diana’s 
dilemma remains. But even if Diana accepts that the problem of luck is alleviated by the agent having 
some degree of control over his internal probabilities, this may do little to alleviate her worries, for she 
notices that the problem reappears at a new level. Whether the agent decides to recursively reorder his 
motivational hierarchy, as well as which order he decides to reorder it to, seems now a matter of 
chance. Recursive decisions are also part of the indeterministic world and as such subject to 
randomness. 
This regress is unavoidable. What Diana sees clearly is of course, as Hume put it, that “tis 
impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and absolute necessity” (Hume 1739, p. 124). If 
ontological indeterminism is true, “…the impossibility of ultimate self-determination as to desire is a 
                                                             
53 What Doyle calls ‘adequate determinism’ (Doyle 2013) 
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simple conceptual truth…” (Strawson 1986, p. 42). Simply put, the hardest version of the problem of luck 
cannot be undone within an ontologically indeterministic framework. It is an unavoidable part of it and 
has no strong solution. If we insist that free will excludes deterministically caused choices, as Diana 
thinks, the problem of luck confronts us with a conceptual choice. We must either accept that the 
concept of free will is an innate contradiction, a contradictio in terminis, or - if we want to continue 
talking intelligibly of free will without turning to compatibilism - we must reconceptualize it in a way that 
accepts this randomness as part of it. Taking this choice seriously is by no means a trivial matter in 
philosophy, and accepting this kind of reconceptualization may seem to bite a bullet too big to swallow. 
Van Inwagen for instance arrives at this junction without taking either position. He thinks that there 
must be something wrong with the problem of luck but he hasn’t “the faintest idea what the nature of 
the error is” (Van Inwagen 2017, p. 165). A conclusion to a thorough reflection on the problem that is as 
remarkably honest as it is problematic: To have an argument with which one can find no error after 
thorough investigation - and yet to reject the conclusion. 
Instead of despairing at the problem of luck or leaving it at the doorstep of mystery, we should 
take its lessons to heart. What the problem shows is that if ontological indeterminism is true, we must 
accept internal randomness as part of human agency. This embrace of luck can also be found in Robert 
Kane’s account of self-forming actions, where he dissolves the line between indeterminism and agent 
when he says that there is no point at which the agent stops and “chance ‘takes over’” (Kane 1999, p. 
232). 
Although the fundamental randomness that is part of us cannot be eliminated, it can be 
increased or decreased by influencing the probabilities of our internal dice-game if the agent has the 
capacity for recursive decisions. One consequence of this view is that freedom of the will can sensibly be 
quantified as a matter of degrees. The greater the influence our recursive decisions can have on our 
internal probabilities, the freer our will is. As already noted free will does not depend upon the 
probability distributions of the competing desires but on the potential effect of recursive decisions upon 
these probabilities. In other words, it is not the probability distributions of the different desires in the 
motivational hierarchy that constitute the degree of freedom but rather it is the potential effectiveness 
of recursive decisions to change these internal probabilities that constitutes the degree of free will the 
agent has. How much of an effect a recursive decision potentially has, in turn, depends on the structure 
of the agent – just as the potential speed of a projectile depends on the structure of the device that 
launches it (famously, the Trebuchet can launch a similarly weighted projectile much further than the 
Onager Catapult). An agent whose recursive decisions can have a great influence on his motivational 
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structure and the weights of his desires is more free than someone whose recursive decisions only have 
a weak influence. Both agents are free, but one more so than the other. An increase in freedom may 
come through learning via introspection, e.g. to the extent that self-efficacy beliefs about free will and 
recursive capabilities can increase the effects of recursive decisions (Bandura 1977, 2006), or it may 
grow through training whereby an agent that actively engages in recursive decision-making can 
strengthen the influence of any future recursive decisions. In this way, recursive decision-making is also 
in a sense a skill that one can improve. Free will is then something that can be learned and trained over 
the course of an agent’s life. In any case, the stronger the potential effects of recursive decisions, the 
freer the agent: The better equipped he is to take control of the randomness within him. Free will is 
then more appropriately conceptualized as a graded phenomenon. If we similarly hold that the notion of 
agency corresponds to the extent that an agent can determine whether a given action occurs or not and 
since complete self-determination is impossible within an indeterministic ontology, then agency too is 
something graded. The quantification of freedom of the will can be seen as a product of the strength 
and scope of the agent’s recursive decision-making. Where strength indicates the size of the effect the 
agent’s recursive decisions can have on his internal probabilities, i.e. by how much he can increase or 
decrease his internal probabilities by recursively reordering his motivational hierarchy, and scope 
indicates the proportion of the agent’s total desires that he can recursively influence. The maximally 
free agent is one who can recursively reorder every one of their desires and for whom their recursive 
decisions have a maximally strong effect (whatever this limit may be). 
A second consequence that follows the graduation of free will is that free will can vary across 
time and context within the same person. It may be, for instance, that the influence of recursive 
decisions does not extend to certain desires and that these desires have a very high probability of 
becoming effective when confronted with their object. In other words, it is possible that recursive 
decisions can only affect a subset of the agent’s total motives, and that some motives outside of this 
subset are very likely to become effective. Consider, for example, the case of drug addiction. If the drug 
addict is one of Diana’s agents, there is of course still some (vanishingly small) chance that he will not 
take his drug of choice when presented with the opportunity. But furthermore, it may be that the drug 
addict cannot recursively affect his desire to take his drug of choice – his higher-order desire remains, 
but his capacity for recursively reordering his desire to take the drug is reduced to nil. The probability for 
whether he takes his drug or not in situations where he is confronted with it is then entirely out of the 
addict’s hands. By handicapping his capacity to recursively influence his desire to take drugs the 
addiction robs the agent of his free will in situations where this desire is confronted with its object. 
5. Recursive Decisions, Indeterminism, and Luck 
 
75 
However, it is possible that the agent can nevertheless recursively reorder the hierarchy of other 
motives within him. It is then not in every situation that the addict lacks free will. Only when he acts on 
a desire that is outside the scope of his recursive decision-making is he acting without free will. It is only 
within particular contexts that the addict’s freedom of will suffers. However, it is also possible that a 
desire which is at one time outside the scope of the agent’s recursive decisions may at a later point fall 
within this scope and be subject to recursive influence. Similarly, it may be that the strength of an 
agent’s recursive decisions – especially as regards certain desires – may increase or decrease over time. 
For instance, when children first acquire the capacity for recursive decision-making, such decisions may 
only have weak effects on their motivational hierarchy. But with time the strength of a person’s 
recursive decisions may grow (or diminish). Both the scope and the strength of an individual’s recursive 
decision-making may change and develop over time. 
What we are left with is then a changing, developing, and growing kind of free will. One that 
changes over the course of an agent’s lifetime and can be quantified in the manner outlined above. 
Agents with the capacity for recursive decisions have certainly gained an extra degree of freedom that is 
not entailed by mere indeterministic decision-making since they have gained an aspect of control over 
their own internal probabilities. Whether this is enough to entirely alleviate Diana’s worries is for her to 
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6. Concluding Remarks and Future 
Prospects 
At the beginning of this thesis, I asked how probabilistic uncertainties in the mechanisms underlying 
intentional action should affect our understanding of free will. The objective of the thesis was to provide 
an account of free will that was sensitive to the folk-conception of free will, the probabilities reflected in 
neuroscientific models, and the problem of luck. In doing so, the thesis aimed to contribute to the folk-
psychology of free will, general epistemology but especially as it pertains to the interpretation of 
probabilities, and finally to the general free will debate by providing an account for agentive control in 
light of luck whereby the agent can influence their internal probabilities via recursive decision-making. In 
the four papers that make up this dissertation, four particular questions related to the research question 
was addressed: 
1. What is the folk-concept of free will? 
2. Does belief in physicalism drive different free will conceptions? 
3. Are there good reasons to interpret the probabilities of scientific models in terms of ontological 
indeterminism? 
4. What kind of luck-reducing control might indeterministic agents have over their own internal 
probabilities? 
The first two questions were addressed by running a set of experiments. The first experiment aimed to 
assess the folk-concept of free will. Two novel additions were included in the experimental design. First 
of all, by including vignettes that framed indeterminism as the presence of probabilistic chance, the 
design accounted for the possibility that laypeople have hard incompatibilist intuitions whereas previous 
designs have assumed that the ordinary concept of free will must be either compatibilist or 
incompatibilist. Secondly, the design included controls for understanding errors such as bypassing and 
intrusion effects, to ensure that participants understood the philosophically relevant concepts as 
intended, i.e. in the philosophically relevant way. These novelties were carried over in the follow-up 
experiment that looked into whether beliefs in physicalism contra substance dualism lead to different 
free will conceptions. Our findings support the idea that folk-concepts are incompatibilist, but not hard 
incompatibilist. And though it appeared that more physicalist beliefs drove more incompatibilist free will 
conceptions, this effect was shown to in fact be mediated by physicalists being more likely to interpret 
deterministic descriptions as entailing epiphenomenalism. Nevertheless, when determinism was 
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interpreted as philosophers intend it, we found that whether people were physicalist or substance 
dualist their free will conception was incompatibilist. 
 These two experiments have at least two significant limitations, however. The first and perhaps 
most pressing limitation that invites further research, is that the experiments here only employed non-
moral vignettes. It has been shown that the emotional salience of the vignettes affects laypeople’s free 
will conceptions and that more emotionally salient vignettes drive more compatibilist conceptions. A 
promising venture for future research is to investigate if this effect of emotional salience on the folk-
conception of free will remains when controlling for the understanding errors as we have done here. 
The findings from such experiments, that apply moral vignettes with the appropriate controls, might 
further solidify – or problematize – the findings of this thesis. A second and significant limitation is that 
the populations tested in the two experiments here were western-based populations. It is an open 
question worth investigating whether or not the results will be cross-culturally validated. Since some 
cross-cultural differences have already been demonstrated in the literature, it will be of interest for 
further investigations whether free will conceptions genuinely vary across cultures or if any such 
difference is driven by variance in the common understanding errors. 
 The third question was addressed in the third paper. It was argued that regardless of which 
epistemic approach we adopt, direct scientific realism, virtue epistemology, or epistemic pragmatism we 
have sufficient reason to accept ontological indeterminism in light of best-explanation probabilistic 
models. Particular emphasis was put on the virtue epistemological approach and the virtue of self-
criticism. It was argued that in order to be genuinely self-critical, we must be able to answer what could, 
in principle if not in practice, change our view. In light of best-explanation probabilistic models, it was 
argued that only indeterminists could satisfy the principle of a critical attitude. Thus, we should be 
ontological indeterminists. 
 The fourth question was addressed in the fourth and final paper of this thesis. Although it was 
conceded that the hard problem of luck had no perfect solution, it was argued that this confronted us 
with a conceptual choice: We must either give up the idea of freedom in ontologically indeterministic 
worlds or we must accept an aspect of randomness as part of free will. It was argued that, although an 
aspect of luck remains, indeterministic agents with the capacity for recursive decision-making gain an 
important kind of control over their own internal probabilities – a kind of control that constitutes 
freedom of the will. Within this framework, freedom of the will was conceived as a graded phenomenon 
tied to the causal potential of an agent’s recursive decisions. Although it is argued that the capacity for 
recursive decision-making constitutes freedom of the will in indeterministic agents, the question 
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remains whether human beings actually have this capacity or not. Translating the recursive framework 
into a concrete empirical model with specific hypotheses to be put to the test would be an exciting 
future prospect for those who agree that this capacity would constitute free will.  
 One final future prospect that deserves mention is that the discussion so far has omitted any 
comments on moral responsibility. Indeed, moral responsibility is at the heart of questions and 
discussions about free will. It will no doubt be a matter of discussion, whether the account of free will as 
the capacity for recursive decision-making salvages any justification for moral responsibility, as well as 



















Supplementary notes 1: 
For the high-stake version of the deterministic vignette, the last paragraph was changed to the 
following: 
 
“For example, one day John decides to marry his fiancée Laura. Like everything else, this decision was 
completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same 
up until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to marry Laura at that 
point in time. If time was turned back over and over again to the exact same moment just before John 
made his decision, then it had to happen that he would decide to marry Laura at that moment every 
time.” 
 
For the high-stake version of the indeterministic vignette, the last paragraph was changed to the 
following: 
 
“For example, one day Finn decides to marry his fiancée Patricia. Like everything else, this decision was 
not completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the 
same up until Finn made his decision, then it did not have to happen that Finn would decide to marry 
Patricia at that point in time. If time was turned back over and over again, to the exact same moment 
just before Finn made his decision, then it did not have to happen that he would decide to marry Patricia 
at that moment every time.” 
 
For the high-stake version of the probabilistic, the last paragraph was changed to the following: 
 
“For example, one day Martin decides to marry his fiancée Julia. Like everything else, this decision was 
matter of probabilities. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up until Martin made his 
decision, then there was a certain probability that Martin would decide to marry Julia at that point in 
time. If time was turned back over and over again, to the exact same moment just before Martin made 
his decision, then some of the times he would decide to marry Julia at that moment, and some of the 
times he would decide not to marry Julia at that moment. 




Supplementary notes 2: 
The six understanding questions: 
1. Decisions:  “In Universe [x], do a person’s decisions have an effect on what they do?” 
2. Desires:  “In Universe [x], do a person’s desires have an effect on what they do?” 
3. Beliefs: “In Universe [x], do a person’s beliefs have an effect on what they do?” 
4. Control over: “In Universe [x], does a person have control over what they do?” 
5. Past: “In Universe [x], does the past have an influence on what a person does?” 
6. Could have done otherwise: “In Universe [x], could a person have decided to do otherwise?” 
 
The scale for answering questions 1-5: 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t Know 
 
The scale for answering question 6: 
 Yes, Even if she had the exact same wants and beliefs 
 Only if her wants or beliefs had been different 
 No, not even if her wants and beliefs had been different 
 Don’t Know  
 
For analysis, the ‘past’ and ‘control over’ questions were excluded because they have no clear right or 
wrong answer for the indeterminism and probabilistic vignettes. 
 
Supplementary notes 3: 
The understanding questions were scored in the following way:  
 
For the ‘decisions’, ‘desires’, and ‘beliefs’ questions, the correct answer to these questions in all 
universes was yes, indicating the presence of mental causation. A correct answer to either of these 




The ‘could have done otherwise’ question was the most important of the control questions, as 
getting this wrong indicates a different understanding of the metaphysics described in the vignettes 
than what philosophers have in mind. The correct answer to this question was “Only if her beliefs and 
desires had been different” for the determinism vignette, and “yes, even if her beliefs and desires were 
exactly the same” for the indeterminism and probabilistic vignettes. The “no, not even if her beliefs and 
desires had been different” reply was wrong in all cases, as it indicates an epiphenomenal reading of the 
vignettes (the bypassing effect). The ‘yes, even if her beliefs and desires were exactly the same’ was 
wrong in the deterministic vignettes, indicating an indeterminist reading (the intrusion effect). An 
answer of ‘don’t know’ was also coded as wrong, as it did not indicate that the participant clearly 
understood the vignette in the intended way.  
The ‘could have done otherwise’ was then coded as either +3 (right answer) or -3 (wrong 
answer). This way the ‘could have done otherwise’ question served as a threshold, as no response that 
got the ‘could have done otherwise’ question wrong could have a score above 0, and a response to the 
control questions that scored 0 or lower were indicative of the presence of either the bypassing effect or 
the intrusion effect. 
 
Supplementary notes 4: 
The two understanding questions and their possible answers are as follows: 




 Eye color 
 Feelings 
 None of the above 
 Don’t Know 
2. “In the world you just read about, if we go back in time to just before John made the decision to 
marry his girlfriend, could he have made a different decision?” 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t Know 




Supplementary notes 5: 
The free will rating question and the possible answers: 
 
1. “In the world you just read about, is it possible for a person to have free will?” 
 Yes, very certain 
 Yes, somewhat certain 
 Yes, very uncertain 
 Don’t Know 
 No, very uncertain 
 No, somewhat certain 
 No, very certain 
 
Supplementary notes 6: 
The five dualism questions: 
1. The fact that we have souls that are distinct from our material bodies is what makes humans 
unique. 
2. Each person has a non-physical essence that makes that person unique. 
3. The human mind cannot simply be reduced to the brain. 
4. The human mind is more than just a complicated biological machine. 
5. Human action can only be understood in terms of our souls and minds and not just in terms of 
our brains. 
 
The scale for answering the dualism questions: 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
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